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"Ships and sails proper for the heavenly air should be fashioned.
Then there will also be people,




Cost is one of the biggest obstacles to sending humans to Mars. However, spacecraft
costs are typically not taken into consideration until after the preliminary vehicle andmission
concepts have been designed. Once costs have been estimated, managers and project teams
often lack confidence that the final cost of the mission will match the preliminary estimates.
The present work provides a robust methodology for using cost as a valid metric early in
the design phase of future human Mars Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) vehicles. This
is done in three parts. First, state of the art parametric costing methods are applied to three
Mars EDL vehicle concepts. Second, a methodology is presented which advances the state
of the art in estimating the cost of space vehicles, specifically those used for EDL. This
is done by automating portions of the cost estimation process, and integrating parametric
cost tools with other systems analysis tools so that the effect of any change in vehicle or
mission design on the mission cost can be determined more efficiently. Finally two of the
primary parametric cost estimating tools used at NASA and in industry are tested in a blind
validation study. To date, no such validation study has been published in the literature. In
addition, standard parametric cost estimating methodologies and assumptions are compared
with historical data and are modified to improve predictive capabilities.
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In 1952, 9 years before Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space, Werner
von Braun published the first architecture outlining a human mission to Mars, "Das
Marsprojekt"[1]. Von Braun proposed a fleet of ten spacecraft and a total of 70 crew
traveling to Mars as soon as 1965. The first crew to the surface would land via a glider at
one of the Martian poles using skis. The crew would then trek 6,500 km to the equator to
construct a base camp and runway for the remaining crewed vessels to land. After 443 days
on the surface, the crew would reuse the gliders as assent vehicles to return to their ships
orbiting Mars, and eventually Earth.
The first successful mission to Mars was in 1965, however, it was the unmanned
Mariner 4 probe making a flyby, and not the massive fleet of ten spacecraft Von Braun
envisioned. During its flyby Mariner 4 discovered that the Martian atmosphere is ten times
thinner than Von Braun predicted, making his plan of using winged gliders as an Entry,
Descent, and Landing (EDL) system infeasible. Since "Das Marsprojekt" many studies
have been performed detailing plans of sending humans to Mars[2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Each had proposed that the mission was feasible within 10-30 years, but Mars has remained
10-30 years in the future since "Das Marsprojekt."
1.1. MOTIVATION
There are many reasons for why Mars perpetually remains 10-30 years in the future.
This is partly because of the numerous technical challenges which must be conquered in
order to send humans to Mars. There are a large number of technologies, capabilities,
vehicles, and procedures which must first be developed before a humans to Mars mission
can take place. These include but are not limited to:
21. Developing a heavy lift launch vehicle[4, 8, 11],
2. Developing an in space propulsion stage to get the crew to and from Mars (Options
include cryogenic chemical, storable chemical, Solar Electric Propulsion (SEP), and
Nuclear Thermal Rockets (NTRs) )[12, 13, 14],
3. Developing autonomous rendezvous and docking capabilities and other deep space
autonomous operations capabilities[15],
4. Developing a deep space habitat to keep the crew alive on their trip to and from
Mars[16],
5. Protecting the crew from hazardous space radiation on the trip to and from Mars, as
well as on the surface[17, 18],
6. Developing EDL vehicles to land crew and cargo on the surface of Mars[19],
7. Developing a habitat for the crew to live in on the surface of Mars[20],
8. Developing surface mobility systems[4, 8],
9. Developing surface power systems (either nuclear or solar)[21, 22],
10. Developing In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) technologies to take advantage of
Martian resources, thereby reducing the necessary logistics cargo[23, 24],
11. Developing systems to protect astronauts from Martian dust and perchlorates in
Martian soil[25, 26],
12. Developing a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV)[27],
13. Developing high reliability Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) equip-
ment to reduce the number of logistic resupply and spare parts needed for mission
critical hardware[28, 29],
314. Determining what medical supplies and equipment are most likely to be needed on a
multi year Mars mission with little to no logistics resupply[30],
15. Developing in space additive manufacturing capabilities so that spare parts can be
produced in space or on the surface of Mars[31],
16. Developing cryogenic fluid management systems to allow for zero boil off propellant
systems to be utilized[32],
17. Developing a vehicle that can enter the Earth’s atmosphere on a trajectory coming
from Mars, withstand the heat of reentry, and safely return the crew to Earth[33],
18. Human factors both mental and physical associated with long duration spaceflight[34,
35].
All of the challenges listed above can be solved with enough engineering effort[3, 8].
However, the biggest obstacle in the way of sending humans to Mars is the cost of solving
the above challenges[2, 3, 8, 36]. Some might argue that the biggest obstacle in the way
of sending humans to Mars is politics, but the reason it is a political issue is primarily
because of the high cost. Many politicians, scientists, and even Carl Sagan have wondered
if sending humans toMars is worth what is likely to be an endeavor on the order of hundreds
of billions of dollars[37, 36]. Thus, the key to sending humans to Mars is determining the
most cost effective combination of vehicles and technologies to send humans to Mars and
safely return them to Earth.
Although cost is the biggest obstacle to sending humans to Mars, mission costs are
typically ignored until after the preliminary vehicle concept and mission architecture have
been designed. Meanwhile, design decisions intended to reduce cost are often based on
the assumption that lower mass means lower cost, which is not true in all circumstances.
After the preliminary design of a newmission is complete, a cost estimate will be performed
analyzing a small number of design alternatives, but ignoring the vast majority of the design
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common for management and project teams to lack confidence that the estimated costs will
match the final costs of the mission[38]. Thus, there is clearly a need for robust and accurate
cost estimating methods that can be applied early in the design process to examine a large
tradespace of alternative designs.
Any crewed mission to Mars will need at a minimum a MAV and a habitat deployed
to the surface of Mars. The mass and volume constraints imposed by these two elements
will drive many of the requirements of the EDL vehicle. However, any payload limitations
of the EDL vehicle will also limit the design options of theMAV and habitat. The combined
EDL vehicle with its payload of MAV, and or habitat, will drive the design requirements of
most other elements in the mission architecture, in particular the in space propulsion stage
and the heavy lift launch vehicle. Thus, the design tradespace of the EDL vehicle will have
a critical effect on the design and therefore the cost of nearly all other hardware elements
of a human Mars mission. For these reasons this dissertation focuses on a systems and cost
analysis of EDL vehicles that are currently being considered by NASA to send humans to
Mars.
1.2. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this dissertation are threefold.
1. Provide a cost estimate of threeMars EDLvehicle concepts currently being considered
by NASA to send humans to Mars using state-of-the-art parametric cost estimation
tools and methods.
2. Develop and demonstrate a methodology that advances the state-of-the-art in estimat-
ing the cost of space vehicles, specifically those used for EDL.
53. Validate the costing tools and methods used in this dissertation to ensure that the
results presented are trusted by those making design decisions for future NASA
spacecraft.
1.3. CONTRIBUTIONS
The first contribution of this dissertation was a cost estimate and comparison of
three different Mars EDL vehicle concepts. This work was presented at a NASA technology
forum and may be used in the future by decision makers to guide which EDL technologies
receive further funding.
The second contribution was the development of a partially automated approach
to modeling cost that integrates the cost tool SEER-H with a number of systems analysis
models. This was accomplished via a python code known as SAPE-C (Systems Analysis for
Planetary EDL–Cost). SAPE-C is an extension to the systems analysis code SAPE which
integrates a number of different tools, models, and codes for analysis of EDL vehicles.
SAPE-C allows the cost of entire design tradespaces to be analyzed, whereas previously
only the costs of a small number of point designs would be estimated. This allows for
costs to be estimated earlier in the design process and can show how changing one aspect
of a vehicle, mission parameter, or technology will affect the entire cost of a campaign or
vehicle. This work was presented at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
(AIAA) SPACE Forum in 2018. After being presented at AIAA SPACE, the work was
invited to be presented at a NASA EDL technology interchange meeting. The work was
then submitted and accepted to the AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets.
The third contribution was a blind validation study of the parametric cost estimation
tools PRICE TruePlanning and SEER-H. These tools are commonly used at NASA and in
industry to estimate the costs of major hardware acquisitions such as spacecraft, aircraft, and
6marine vessels. However, despite their widespread use, there are no independent validation
studies of these tools published in the literature. The blind validation study was presented
at the 2018 AIAA SPACE Forum and was later submitted to the journal Acta Astronautica.
1.4. OUTLINE
The following section provides a literature review on previous analysis of human
Mars EDL vehicles and of the limited literature available on estimating the cost of future
space missions. Section 3 provides an overview of the cost estimating tool SEER-H, and an
overview of three EDL vehicle concepts being considered to take cargo and humans to Mars
as well as a cost estimate of each vehicle concept. Section 4 is derived heavily from a paper
accepted for publication in the AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets. It introduces
the cost and systems analysis tool Systems Analysis for Planetary EDL–Cost (SAPE-C).
Section 5 is derived heavily from a paper submitted to the journal Acta Astronautica, which
details a blind validation study of the parametric cost estimating tool SEER-H. Finally,
Section 6 discusses the conclusions of this dissertation and proposed future work.
72. LITERATURE REVIEW
The following literature review is divided into two sections. The first section is
a review of previous analysis of human rated Mars Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL)
systems. While the second section reviews the limited published literature on estimating
the cost of spacecraft and space systems.
2.1. ANALYSIS OF HUMANMARS EDL SYSTEMS
To date the largest payload landed on Mars was the 900 kg Curiosity Rover[39]. To
land humans on the surface of Mars with all the necessary equipment for them to survive,
complete their mission, and ascend from the Martian surface will require the capability
to land payloads over an order of magnitude larger than the Curiosity Rover. NASA’s
Design Reference Architecture 5 (DRA 5) estimated that EDL vehicles for a humans to
Mars mission would need to land a minimum of 80 t of payload over a campaign in sizes
ranging from 20 to 50 t of payload per lander[4, 6].
For a human mission to Mars, the lander will need to carry a payload mass greater
than or equal to the mass of the largest mission element needed on the surface. This
will likely be either the Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) or the surface habitat for the crew.
Polsgrove et al. conducted a study of crewed MAV concepts and estimated the mass of a
MAV to take four crew from the surface to a 500 km circular orbit around Mars to be 23.7 t.
They also concluded that if In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) was used to manufacture
propellant on the surface ofMars, that the landedmass for aMAV taking four crew to a 1 Sol
Martian orbit could be reduced to 17.2 t[27]. However, a more aggressive ISRU approach
may further reduce the landed mass of the MAV, but may increase the total landed mass
of equipment needed on the surface[23]. This would reduce the payload that an individual
lander would need to deliver to the surface, but increase the number of landers needed to
8complete the mission. A study by Simon et al. on Mars transit habitats and surface habitats
stated that it would be possible to produce a surface habitat with a landed mass under
20 t provided that all cargo and offloadable logistics were offloaded prior to landing[16].
However, it may be possible to reduce that mass further through the use of a light weight
inflatable habitat[40].
In 2008 NASA senior management commissioned the Entry, Descent, and Landing
Systems Analysis (EDL-SA) study to identify technology investments that the agency
would need to make in order to land payloads from 10-50 t on the surface of Mars for
both robotic and human scale missions[41, 42]. The EDL-SA study looked at a range of
different concepts for landing large payload including Rigid Mid-L/D (Lift to Drag Ratio)
Aeroshell, Hypersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerators (HIAD), Supersonic Inflatable
Aerodynamic Decelerators (SIAD), and Supersonic Retro-Propulsion (SRP). The study
compared eight different architectures, which used varying combinations of the previously
mentioned EDL technologies. The eight architectures of the EDL-SA study are summarized
in Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1. Architecture eight, which made use of a HIAD and SIAD,
was the lowest mass option, followed closely by architecture two which replaced the SIAD
with SRP. Architectures one, four, and seven all made use of Rigid Mid-L/D, and were the
next higher mass option. Architectures five and six modeled using extremely large HIADs
to eliminate the need for SRP, were at an even larger mass disadvantage. However, by far
Table 2.1. Combinations of EDL technologies considered in EDL-SA study
Aerocapture Hypersonic Supersonic Subsonic
Architecture 1 Rigid Mid-L/D AS Rigid Mid-L/D AS Propulsion Propulsion
Architecture 2 Lifting HIAD Lifting HIAD Propulsion Propulsion
Architecture 3 N/A Propulsion Propulsion Propulsion
Architecture 4 Rigid Mid-L/D AS Lifting HIAD Propulsion Propulsion
Architecture 5 Rigid Mid-L/D AS Lifting HIAD Lifting HIAD Propulsion
Architecture 6 Lifting HIAD Lifting HIAD Lifting HIAD Propulsion
Architecture 7 Rigid Mid-L/D AS Rigid Mid-L/D AS Drag SIAD Propulsion
Architecture 8 Lifting HIAD Lifting HIAD LSIAD-Skirt Propulsion
9Figure 2.1. Architectures considered by EDL-SA to (40 t landed payload).
the highest mass option was architecture three, which only used propulsion. The two lowest
mass architectures in the EDL-SA study, architectures eight and two, both made use of a
single HIAD for aerocapture and EDL. TheHIADwould then be jettisoned in the supersonic
or subsonic phase of flight. Using the same HIAD for aerocapture and EDL along with
jettisoning it during supersonic flight is now widely considered risky. The current baseline
design for a HIAD entry vehicle includes an aerocapture HIAD which will be discarded in
orbit after aerocapture, and a separate EDL HIAD which will be carried all the way to the
surface of Mars[43].
The Entry, Descent, and Landing Architecture Study (EDLAS) was commissioned
as a follow on to the EDLSA study as a part of the Evolvable Mars Campaign(EMC)[19].
The EDLAS study looked in depth at four competing concepts for landing 20 t of payload on
the surface of Mars. The Rigid Mid L/D[44] and HIAD concepts from the EDLSA study, as
well as two new concepts, the Heritage Capsule modeled after the Apollo capsule[45], and
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a concept making use of a rigid deployable heatshield known as the Adaptive Deployable
Entry and Placement Technology (ADEPT)[46, 47]. The EDLAS concluded that HIAD
was likely to be the most mass efficient followed by ADEPT and Mid L/D. The Heritage
Capsule was not compatible with the EMC assumptions and the work analyzing its design
was not complete at the conclusion of the study. The study noted that while HIAD was
the most mass efficient, ADEPT is in the early stages of development and there is a large
uncertainty in its design and its mass estimates. On the other hand, while the Mid L/D
concept is the most massive it also has strong heritage from the Space Shuttle. While both
the EDLSA study and the EDLAS study have conducted a thorough analysis of the design
of many EDL concepts to land humans onMars, neither study has considered the cost of the
concepts. The expected cost of each vehicle concept will be a key driver of which concepts
are selected for further development.
2.2. TECHNIQUES FOR ESTIMATING THE COST OF FUTURE SPACECRAFT
AND SPACE SYSTEMS
There is very little written in literature on techniques for estimating the cost of
spacecraft and space systems. This is primarily because there is not much information on
the cost of space systems freely available for academics to study, and private companies
do not want their methods of estimating cost revealed lest their profit margins suffer.
Wertz attempted to change this and started the Journal of Reducing Space Mission Cost in
1998 with the goals of achieving "a better, less expensive, more robust, worldwide space
program"[48], and "to bring scholarly, professional research norms and values to this critical
problem of space exploration where conversations and reports are frequently dominated by
hearsay and unsubstantiated claims"[49]. However, the journal ended in the same year
because there were not enough submissions backing up claims of reduced cost with actual
data. AsWertz put it "While most people recognized that discussing cost and cost reduction
in real and substantive terms was good for the space program as a whole, ultimately, there
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were simply not enough organizations willing to take the leap of faith that it would also be
good for them. Indeed, it may be true that what is necessary for the industry as a whole is
not necessarily good for the individual organizations that discuss it"[50].
The limited literature on cost estimating falls into three main categories:
1. general overviews of cost estimating methods, cost models, and their applications,
2. papers introducing a new cost estimating models or methods,
3. papers discussing the limitations of current cost models and methods.
In the first category, the most notable is the NASA cost estimating handbook which
provides NASA’s guidelines for cost estimation and describes the uses of most of the
cost models employed by NASA[51]. Wertz and Larson in their book "Reducing Space
Mission Cost" have a chapter on cost estimating methods, which primarily focuses on the
mathematical methods for developing CERs (Cost Estimating Relationships), and pitfalls
to avoid when developing CERs. The rest of the book does not deal with cost estimation
but rather best practices to reduce the cost of space missions[52]. Trivailo et al. provides a
review of cost estimating models and methods for space mission hardware used by industry
and NASA including the types of missions each model is suited for and the phase of the
mission where each model is applicable[53].
In the second category Young introduces the method of using optimistic (least),
realistic (likely), and pessimistic (most) estimates to define the lower bound, mode and
upper bound of a triangle or beta cost distribution[54]. Science Applications International
Corporation (SAIC) developed the Microsoft Excel based parametric cost model NAFCOM
(NASA/Air Force Cost Model) from historical data on over 155 past NASA and Air Force
programs[55]. NAFCOM estimates are primarily based on mass estimates of spacecraft
subsystems. The user also has the ability to pick specific historical missions as analogs to
the mission they are modeling. NASA’s new cost model, Project Cost Estimating Capability
(PCEC) is derived from NAFCOM. The goal of PCEC is to improve upon NAFCOM by
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minimizing subjective inputs, and emphasizing quality of input parameters over quantity
[56]. Two of the most commonly used commercially provided suits of cost models are the
PRICE suit by Price Systems Inc., and SEER by Galorath Inc.[57, 58].
In the third category, Wertz wrote an editorial in the first issue of the Journal of
Reducing SpaceMission Cost that "Reducing space mission cost is hard if we knowwhat the
costs are and virtually impossible if we don’t." Wertz goes on to discuss that since cost data
is sensitive it is difficult for cost estimators to gain access to it to produce reliable models. He
then asks that governments and companies make their cost data for space programs public
or at least allow cost models based on that data to be made public[59]. Jones attributes
the high number of missions with high cost overruns to four main factors: undefined,
misunderstood or changed mission scope, deliberate low bidding by contractors, excessive
optimism of project planners, and finally poor cost estimating methods and data[60]. Keller
et al. also admonish current cost estimating methods citing that the average final cost of
a US space program exceeds the initial cost estimate by 45%. They blame this partially
on parametric cost models claiming that "parametric models only predict the past." Since
parametric models are built on historical cost data they will have trouble predicting the cost
of any hardware which is significantly different from previous missions[61]. An example of
this is the report from the NASA Associate Deputy Administrator for Policy that estimated
using NAFCOM that if NASA built the Falcon 9 rocket it would have cost over ten times
the amount SpaceX spent. The report also estimated that SpaceX under a firm fixed price
contract should have spent about five times as much as they did. The estimators later met
with representatives from SpaceX to adjust the inputs to the NAFCOM model and were
able to get an updated estimate to match SpaceX’s cost. There were several incorrect
assumptions made in the initial estimate which were corrected in the updated estimate.
For example, in the initial estimate the estimators assumed the Merlin engines were new
developments when in reality they were nearly identical to the engines flown on the Falcon 1
rocket. The estimators also unintentionally included the weight of the electronics enclosures
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in the weight of the electronics. The reason for the gross overestimate of the costs was not
necessarily the fault of NAFCOM but rather the estimators not having all the data they
needed to complete the estimate properly[62].
The most notable omission from the literature are studies validating cost methods
and models. Galorath Inc. and Price Systems Inc., the companies that produce the SEER
and PRICE suits of cost modeling software, have conducted their own internal validation
studies of their products[63, 64]. However, they do not detail the methods used in the
validation studies and the studies have not undergone peer review. The primary focus of
these studies appears to be to provide their users with better instructions on how to use their
models and to develop standard inputs and assumptions to model various space hardware.
Galorath documents these standard sets of inputs and assumptions in their SEER-H Space
Guidance document, an extremely valuable resource to anyone using SEER to estimate
the cost of a space system[65]. The absence of independent and peer reviewed validation
studies of these models is what motivated the validation studies of the present work found
in Section 5.
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3. INITIAL ESTIMATES OF THREE BASELINE MARS LANDER DESIGNS
This section details cost estimation work done as a follow on of the Mars EDLAS
(Entry, Descent, and Landing Architecture Study)[19] discussed in Section 2.1. The work
in the present section has not been previously published because in 2016, when the work
in the present section was completed, the information was considered sensitive. However,
this work was presented in a Tech-Forum within NASA Langley’s System Analysis and
Concepts Directorate (SACD) and was reviewed by several Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
in both cost estimation and EDL.
The following section of the present section details the use of the parametric cost
modeling tool SEER-H to estimate the cost of future space hardware. Sections 3.2, 3.3, and
3.4 discuss the design and mission concept of operations (ConOps) and provide a cost
estimate of the Cobra–MRV, ADEPT, and HIAD entry vehicle concepts. Section 3.5
compares the HIAD, ADEPT, and Cobra–MRV concepts, presents an uncertainty analysis
of their costs, and provides concluding remarks for the present section.
Note that mass estimates for Cobra–MRV, ADEPT, and HIAD presented in Ta-
bles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are slightly different from the masses reported in the EDLAS study
and the papers which describe Cobra–MRV, ADEPT, and HIAD. A close reading of the
aforementioned papers shows that the masses in the papers do not always agree from doc-
ument to document either. This is to be expected at this early stage of the design cycle
as designs of the vehicles are rapidly varying. The masses reported in the present work
represent the most up to date estimates available at the time this work was completed in late
2016.
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3.1. USING SEER-H TO MODEL THE COST OF FUTURE HARDWARE
System Estimation and Evaluation of Resources-Hardware (SEER-H) or simply
SEER is a commercial parametric cost estimating tool developed by Galorath Inc. It is
one of the standard tools used by NASA to estimate the costs of space missions for early
planning and to assess mission proposals. Galorath performed an internal validation study
of SEER where it was used to predict the costs of 15 NASA space science missions.
Galorath found that SEER’s mean error in predicting mission cost was -1% with a standard
deviation of 19%[63]. Section 5 contains an independent validation study of SEER in an
attempt to verify Galorath’s results. The validation study of SEER was also presented at the
2018 AIAA Space Forum[66] and is currently being reviewed for publication in the journal
Acta Astronautica. The primary result of the SEER validation study was that when using
SEER’s uncertainty quantification capabilities 75% of the cases studied fell within SEER’s
80% confidence interval,1 thereby validating the predictions of SEER.
The backbone of SEER is its proprietary Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs)
and associated database of cost history. To model the cost of a spacecraft in SEER, the
user inputs "Work Elements" which correspond to different components of the spacecraft
using SEER’s Graphical User Interface (GUI). An annotated screenshot of SEER’s GUI
can be viewed in Figure 3.1. On the left side of the GUI, the user defines a Work Break-
down Structure (WBS), which corresponds roughly to the spacecraft or payload’s Master
Equipment List (MEL). Each item in the WBS is known as a "Work Element" and can
be of type "Mechanical/Structural," "Electronics," "Electro-Optical System (EOS)," or "In-
tegrated Circuit (IC)." After selecting the Work Element type, the user then chooses a
"Platform," "Standard," "Acquisition Category," and "Application." The Platform defines
the operating environment (i.e., Air-Manned, Air–Unmanned, Sea, Submersible, Space–
Manned, Space-Unmanned, etc.). The Standard defines the general reliability requirements
1SEER only outputs probability levels of an estimate’s CDF in intervals of 10%. Thus 80% confidence
intervals must be used as opposed to the more common 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.1. Annotated screenshot of SEER’s GUI. Inputs in this example are for illustration
purposes only and are not used in the present work.
(i.e., Commercial, Industrial, Military specifications, Space–Communications and Media,
or Space–Science, Command & Control). The Platform and Standard typically have the
same setting for all work elements in a SEER model. The Acquisition Category defines
the level of development effort required to design the component or integrate an existing
design (i.e., build to print, buy and integrate, minor modifications, major modifications,
etc.). Finally, Application defines the function of the Work Element. SEER’s database con-
tains hundreds of mechanical/structural Applications for hardware components; examples
include payload adapter, separation mechanism, space propulsion component, aerodynamic
control surface, spacecraft antenna–dish, gimbal mechanism, etc. If the user selects the
Platform, Standard, Acquisition Category, and Application of a particular Work Element,
SEER will auto fill the majority of the inputs, or "Parameters," of the Work Element.
The Parameters are the inputs to SEER’s CERs and are different for each Work Element
type. The Parameters for Mechanical/Structural Work Elements include mass, material
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composition, complexity of form, complexity of fit, construction process, amount of new
design, design replication, certification level, and a number of other inputs. Electrical
Work Elements are modeled using Parameters such as the number of printed circuit boards,
number of discrete components per board, number of integrated circuits per board, clock
speed, number of pins, percent new design, and a number of other inputs. The EOS and
IC Parameters are typically specific to the particular application. For example, an optical
bench will include inputs such as number of optical elements, as well as the number and
size of the elements, where as a detector will be estimated using the resolution of the sensor,
radiation tolerance, pixel size etc. If the user knows all these inputs (or can estimate them),
they can potentially improve the accuracy of the estimate or model hardware Applications
that are not included in SEER’s database. That is, if a spacecraft component does not have
a matching Application in SEER, the user can select an analogous technology and alter the
Parameter inputs. For example, flexible TPS is not in SEER’s database, but it was modeled
as multi-layer insulation with adjustments to material composition, complexity of fit/form,
and construction process.
For every Parameter input in SEER the user defines a "least," "likely," and "most"
value corresponding to an optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic assumption for the input.
Mass modeling in the present work assumed the "least" value was the Current Best Estimate
(CBE), the "likely" value was the CBE plus the Mass Growth Allowance (MGA) and the
"most" input was 30%more than the "likely" input. These assumptions are recommended in
Galorath’s SEER Space Guidance document[65]. The NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s
design principles document recommends that space missions carry a 30% mass margin
above the MGA[67] at Preliminary Mission System Review (PMSR). Also, the AIAA and
American National Standards Institute state that a mission is at minimal risk of exceeding
their mass budget if at ATP (Authority to Proceed) its CBE plus MGA is 30% below the
maximum allowable mass for the mission[68]. SEER models uncertainty by assigning
each "work element" a distribution of possible costs in addition to a median cost. The
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least/likely/most inputs for each work element correspond to the lower bound, mode, and
upper bound of a beta distribution. By default, SEER uses the median value of each
beta distribution as the input to its CERs. To model uncertainty SEER can also output a
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF), however, SEER only outputs the CDF in 10%
increments from 10-90%. Thus, an 80% confidence interval instead of the more common
95% confidence interval is used in this study. For more information on how SEER models
uncertainty, see Section 5.3.2
3.2. ANALYSIS OF THE CO-OPTIMIZATION BLUNT-BODY RE-ENTRY
ANALYSIS–MID L/D RIGID VEHICLE (COBRA–MRV) VEHICLE
3.2.1. Cobra–MRV Overview. The Cobra–MRV (Co-Optimization Blunt-body
Re-entry Analysis–Mid L/D Rigid Vehicle) is a high ballistic coefficient, mid lift to drag
ratio, rigid vehicle concept. It was developed using the Ames Research Center (ARC)
COBRA shape optimization tool. The Cobra–MRV has a higher L/D than typical blunt
body entry vehicles but less than a winged vehicle such as the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
Thus, the vehicle has greater cross-range capability, entry corridor width, and potentially
improved landing accuracy over the HIAD and ADEPT concepts. Another advantage of the
Cobra–MRV is that upon landing it sits low to the ground, which allows for easy offloading
of crew and cargo. In an effort to reduce the amount of technology development needed,
and therefore cost, many of the Cobra–MRV’s systems and components are derived from
the Space Shuttle. Shuttle derived items include the body flaps, payload doors, and the
TPS. The windward TPS is made up of Silicone Impregnated Refractory Ceramic Ablator
(SIRCA), while the leeward TPS which is made of Advanced Flexible Reusable Surface
Insulation (AFRSI)[44, 69].
3.2.2. Cobra–MRV ConOps. Figure 3.2 shows the ConOps for the Cobra–MRV
in various phases of EDL aswell as on the surface ofMars as described by Sostaric et al.[44].
After the initial aerocapture of the Cobra–MRV into a nominal 1 Sol orbit around Mars it
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Figure 3.2. Cobra EDL ConOps. Aerocapture not shown.
loiters for a period of time until it is needed on the surface. It deorbits using its RCS thrusters
and at the entry interface has a velocity of 4.7 km/s, flight path angle of -10.8 degrees, and
at a 55 deg angle of attack. When at 3.2 km above the surface and traveling at Mach 1.98
the vehicle pitches up to a 90 deg angle of attack and fires its main engines to neutralize its
horizontal velocity. The vehicle continues to fire its engines, slowing its descent until it is
12.5 m above the Martian surface. The vehicle then descends at a constant rate of 2.5 m/s
until touchdown.
3.2.3. Cobra–MRV Cost Estimate and SEER Model. A MEL for the Cobra–
MRV was obtained from the EDLAS team and used in conjunction with a document
providing technical descriptions of the associated hardware to produce a cost model in
SEER. The providedMELwas broken down into 169 different components, which translated
into 103 work elements in SEER. The MEL and associated documents contain sensitive
information, which cannot be freely distributed so they are not included in the present
work. However, the mass of the subsystems, and a breakdown of the normalized cost
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from the SEER estimate are provided in Table. 3.1. The costs presented in Table 3.1 are
normalized to the average of the first unit production cost of the Cobra–MRV, ADEPT, and
HIAD entry vehicles. The data in Table 3.1 is divided into three sets of two columns. The
Table 3.1. Cobra-MRV Mass and Normalized Cost Breakdown
Predicted Mass (kg) Development Production
Mission Systems Cost 0.925 15% 0.094 12%
Vehicle Systems Cost 1.900 30% 0.151 20%
Structure 22,448 51% 2.234 35% 0.302 39%
MPS 4,047 9% 0.615 10% 0.090 12%
RCS 1,397 3% 0.279 4% 0.052 7%
Power 1,217 3% 0.101 2% 0.022 3%
Avionics 328 1% 0.234 4% 0.053 7%
Thermal 347 1% 0.078 1% 0.004 1%
Dry Mass 29,784 68%
Propellant 14,200 32%
Vehicle Total 43,984 100% 6.366 100% 0.770 100%
Payload 20,000
TMI Mass 63,984
first two columns show the Predicted Mass of the vehicle, vehicle subsystems, and what
fraction of the vehicle mass they make up. Since the payload costs are not considered
in this study, the payload mass is not included in the Vehicle Total, however, the payload
mass is included in the Trans Mars Injection (TMI) Mass. The TMI Mass is the sum
of the payload mass and the vehicle total mass and represents the mass that the in-space
propulsion stage will have to deliver to a TMI orbit. The second set of columns shows a
breakdown of the normalized development costs of the vehicle. The development costs are
all cost associated with the design, development, testing, and evaluation of a spacecraft;
including the costs of prototype hardware, tooling, support equipment, documentation,
etc. The third set of columns shows the breakdown of the production costs of the first
flight unit produced. These costs include the purchase costs of off the shelf components
and raw materials, fabrication, integration and assembly of the final product, production
support (planning, scheduling, inventory, shipping etc.), sustaining engineering (resolving
manufacturing issues and handling changes in the production process), toolmaintenance etc.
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The development and production costs do not include science or technology development
costs, payload costs, mission operations costs (other than flight tests) launch vehicle costs,
ground systems not directly related to the development and production of the vehicle (i.e.
mission control centers, deep space network antennas etc.), and education/public outreach.
The first two rows of Table 3.1 show the Mission Systems cost and Vehicle Systems cost for
the development and production of the vehicle. Both of these categories of systems costs
are made up of Project Management (PM), Systems Engineering (SE), Safety and Mission
Assurance (S&MA,) and Integration, Assembly, and Test (IAT). The Vehicle Systems Cost
is made up of the PM, SE, and IAT costs of the prime contractor responsible for building
the vehicle, while the Mission Systems Cost is made up of the NASA level PM, SE, S&MA,
and IAT costs of managing and overseeing the contractors, defining and tracking mission
requirements, as well as testing and final assembly of the vehicle. Together the systems
cost make up 45% of the development cost and 32% of the production cost. The next row
down is the structure which makes up 51% of the vehicle by mass but only 35% of the
development and 39% of the production cost. The structure subsystem contains all primary
and secondary structures, as well as the TPS, body flap aerosurfaces, payload bay door,
cargo ramp, and landing gear as well as all the associated mechanisms and actuators. The
next two rows after structure are the Main Propulsion System (MPS) and Reaction Control
System (RCS). Both the MPS and RCS utilize CH4-LOX (Methane-Liquid Oxygen) as
a fuel/oxidizer combo. The MPS utilizes 8 100 kN engines with a specific impulse of
360 s while the RCS is a network of 20 4.45 kN thrusters with specific impulses of 325 s.
The mass and cost breakdown for these subsystems contains all the propellant tanks, lines,
fittings, valves, manifolds, cryocoolers, insulation, engines, etc., needed for the MPS and
RCS. The power subsystem contains the on-orbit solar arrays, fuel cells, and all harnessing
and electronics needed to power the spacecraft. The power subsystem is expected to be
modified from the power system of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. Avionics rolls
the mass and cost of the communications, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C),
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and Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystems together. It is assumed that the
majority of the components in the avionics subsystems will be modified from existing
hardware and no new technology development will need to occur.2 Much of the GN&C
hardware is modeled based on the hardware developed in the Autonomous Landing and
Hazard Avoidance Technology (ALHAT) program[70]. Finally, the thermal subsystem is
made up of the deployable radiators and heat rejection systems that work in conjunction
with the cryocoolers to prevent propellant from boiling off in transit to Mars, as well as
cooling the LOX, which is produced on the surface of Mars as a part of the ISRU propellant
manufacturing included in the MAV payload.
3.3. ANALYSIS OF THE ADAPTIVE DEPLOYABLE ENTRY AND PLACEMENT
TECHNOLOGY (ADEPT) VEHICLE
3.3.1. ADEPTOverview. Another lander design under consideration to land large
payloads on Mars is the Adaptive Deployable Entry and Placement Technology (ADEPT)
[46, 47, 71]. The ADEPT concept utilizes a deployable heatshield that is similar mechani-
cally, and in appearance to a large umbrella. When ADEPT is stowed, it allows the lander
to fit within the 10 m fairing of the Space Launch System (SLS), but when needed, it
deploys to a diameter of 16 m (or greater). The ADEPT heatshield is attached to a Mars
DescentModule (MDM), which houses theMPS, RCS, Power, Avionics, TCS, and provides
structures to hold the payload in place. The TPS for the ADEPT heatshield is made of a
3D woven carbon fabric that is held in place by ribs which are attached to movable struts
for deployment[72, 73]. The structures of the ADEPT deployable mechanism are shown in
Figure 3.3a There are several designs being traded for controlling the vehicle in the hyper-
sonic and supersonic phases of entry which can be viewed in Figure 3.3b. The first concept,
2The assumption that the majority of the components in the avionics subsystems will be modified from
existing hardware without requiring a new technology development will likely prove to be incorrect. However,
it is likely that much of the hardware will be shared with other elements in the humans to mars campaign such
as the deep space habitat, in-space propulsion stage, or Orion, and thus, the cost of developing this hardware
is not likely to be carried by the lander. Regardless, the Cobra-MRV, ADEPT, and HIAD vehicles will likely
carry nearly identical avionics so this will not affect cost comparisons between the vehicles.
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(a) ADEPT TPS, Ribs, and Struts structures.
(b) Trades in the ADEPT heat shield design.
Figure 3.3. ADEPT structures and design trades.
which is also the examined in the present study, is known as ACVe (Asymmetric Capsule
Vehicle) and provides a higher L/D ratio as well as lower convective and radiative heating
compared to symmetric forebody shapes[74, 47]. The second is a fixed trim tab which
also provides a higher L/D ratio and reduces convective and radiative heating but not to the
extent that ACVe does[75]. While the fixed trim tab design lacks the optimized performance
of the ACVe it is a simpler design over the ACVe which may save on manufacturing costs.
The third design trade is actively controlled deployable trim tabs. The use of deployable
trim tabs enables the use of a Direct Force Control algorithm to guide the spacecraft to
its targeted landing location on the surface. A study by Cianciolo and Powell showed that
Direct Force Control had several advantages to other control algorithms[76]. The advantage
of Direct Force Control include: saving propellant, reducing landing dispersion, and it does
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not require the main engines to gimbal or deep throttle. ACVe was selected as the baseline
design by the ADEPT team and thus was the only design which had a MEL detailed enough
to do a cost estimate at the time of writing[47].
3.3.2. ADEPT ConOps. The ConOps for the ADEPT concept is shown visually
in Figure 3.4, and is very similar to that of the Cobra–MRV discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Figure 3.4. ADEPT EDL ConOps, rigid heat shield may or may not be detached. Aerocap-
ture not shown.
The vehicle approaches mars on a TMI trajectory provided by an in-space propulsion stage
not modeled in this work. The in-space propulsion stage separates from the lander and
the ADEPT heat shield is deployed. The ADEPT lander then performs an aerocapture
maneuver to a 1 sol orbit around Mars. The ADEPT lander then deploys solar arrays and
loiters in the 1 sol Martian orbit for a period of time up to a year until it is needed on the
surface. The solar arrays are then jettisoned or retracted and the vehicle performs a ~15
m/s ∆V burn to lower its periapsis and enter the Martian atmosphere. At entry interface the
vehicle has an inertial velocity of 4.7 km/s. Figure 3.4 shows heatshield being detached at
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speeds around Mach 2, however, the heatshield will likely be remain attached to the vehicle.
Detaching the heatshield is considered a higher risk option as the heatshield may reconnect
with the vehicle. The current baseline design which is also the design considered in the
present study is to have access doors which open up in the heatshield to expose the main
engine nozzles and allow the landing gear to be extended. The engines are then ignited to
slow the vehicle and neutralize any horizontal velocity. Nominally the vehicle will continue
to slow its descent until it is 12.5 m above the Martian surface at which point it descends at
a constant rate of 2.5 m/s until touchdown.
3.3.3. ADEPT Cost Estimate and SEER Model. A MEL for the ADEPT lander
was obtained from the EDLAS team and used in conjunction with a document providing
technical descriptions of the associated hardware to produce a SEER model. The MEL
was broken down into 336 different components which translated into 158 work elements
in SEER3. The MEL and associated documents are not included in this work because they
contain sensitive information that cannot be freely distributed. However, the mass of the
subsystems, and a breakdown of the normalized cost from the SEER estimate is provided
in Table. 3.2.
Table 3.2 shows that the fraction of the costs allocated to Mission Systems and
Vehicle Systems are nearly identical to those of of the COBRA–MRV. The structures
however, are completely different from Cobra–MRV. The primary structure of the ADEPT
MDM is a cruciform structure similar in form to that used by the descent module of
the Apollo lunar lander[77]. Unlike Apollo, the ADEPT MDM structures are made of
lightweight composite materials that are very labor intensive during production. Thus,
despite making up only 16% of the vehicle mass the MDM structures are 23% of the
production cost. Despite using a similar amount of propellant to the Cobra–MRV, the mass
of the MPS of ADEPT is significantly lighter. This is partially because the Cobra–MRV’s
3299 of the components came from an EXAMINE model of the MDM while the other 37 were from a
model of the ADEPT heatshield provided by the design team. For more information on EXAMINE and the
MDM see Section 4.2
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Table 3.2. ADEPT Mass and Normalized Cost Breakdown
Predicted Mass (kg) Development Production
Mission Systems Cost 1.112 14% 0.149 12%
Vehicle Systems Cost 2.334 29% 0.244 20%
Structure 5,573 16% 1.437 18% 0.279 23%
MPS 3,371 10% 0.588 7% 0.091 8%
RCS 1,486 4% 0.328 4% 0.066 5%
Power 1,163 3% 0.144 2% 0.037 3%
Avionics 345 1% 0.229 3% 0.052 4%
Thermal 487 1% 0.094 1% 0.009 1%
ADEPT 8,552 24% 1.778 22% 0.27 23%
Dry Mass 20,977 60%
Propellant 14,264 40%
Vehicle Total 35,241 100% 8.043 100% 1.199 100%
Payload 20,000
TMI Mass 55,241
propulsion tanks are placed further away from the engines for stability purposes, whereas
the tanks in the ADEPT MDM are located directly above the engines and require shorter
feed lines. Also, since the ADEPT TMI Mass is lower than that of the Cobra–MRV the
engines are not required to produce as much thrust and thus are smaller and lighter. In
the original EDLAS study, it was assumed that each of the entry concepts would use the
same set of eight CH4-LOX 100 kN engines. However, the present work utilized a model
of the engines which was sized to provide a Thrust-to-Weight ratio of 1.5 g (in earth g’s).
Thus, the engine size and mass is reduced slightly. Other than slight differences due to
sizing, the RCS, Power, Avionics, and Thermal subsystems are all identical to those in the
Cobra–MRV model. The major difference is in the addition of the ADEPT deployable
heatshield that makes up nearly a quarter of the mass and cost of the entire vehicle. The
deployable heatshield contains many large complex structures and mechanisms made out
of unique materials. Most of the composite structures will require time intensive hand lay
ups and the entire structure is made of moving parts which will require precise tolerances
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and extensive testing. These factors will increase the cost during both development and




3.4.1. HIADOverview. TheHypersonic InflatableAerodynamicDecelerator (HIAD)
lander concept is similar to ADEPT, however, it utilizes a heat shield that deploys via in-
flation rather than mechanisms. The MDM of the HIAD lander is identical in design to
that of ADEPT but is scaled to accommodate the smaller propellant tanks required as well
as the smaller structures required to support the fuel tanks and the smaller heatshield. It
is currently unknown if a HIAD can withstand a heat pulse from aerocapture followed by
another heat pulse for EDL after loitering a year in a 1 sol Martian orbit. Thus, the baseline
design for the HIAD lander carries two HIADs one for aerocapture and one for EDL. This
also helps to mitigate the risk of a micrometeoroid damaging the flexible TPS, inflatable
structure of the HIAD, or any of the other lander structures.
Flexible TPS wraps around the windward side of the HIAD to absorb and deflect
the heat from atmospheric entry. The flexible TPS is made of several layers of thermally
insulating fabrics. Figure 3.5 shows a photo of the first generation of HIAD flexible TPS.
The outermost layers are made of a refractory fabric consists of several layers of woven
ceramic materials such as Nextel or Silicon Carbide. The outer layers are sized to handle the
heat rate experienced during entry. The inner layers are made of several layers of insulating
fabrics such as carbon felt, Pyrogel, or Aerogel. The insulating layers are sized to handle
the heat load experienced during entry. The innermost layer is made of a single Kapton
layer serves as a gas barrier, since the outer and inner fabric layers are porous, this prevents
airflow from reaching the HIAD structures [78, 79, 80, 81].
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Figure 3.5. Photo of first generation HIAD TPS
The inflatable structure is made of several stacked inflatable tori held together by
Kevlar straps[82, 83]. The configuration of tori and Kevlar straps for a 6 mHIAD test article
can be seen in Figure 3.6. Each tori is made of a flexible polymer inner bladder surrounded
by a composite braid for support.
Figure 3.6. Cross section of 6 m HIAD test article’s structures
There have been several previous flight tests of HIAD technology know as the
Inflatable Reentry Vehicle Experiments (IRVE)[84, 85]. The IRVE vehicles carried tanks
of pressurized gas to inflate the HIAD structures, but future HIADs will likely use gas
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generators instead[86]. The use of gas generators significantly reduces the mass of the
inflation system and will eliminate the risk involved with carrying an additional pressure
vessel on a long duration spaceflight.
3.4.2. HIAD ConOps. The lander is delivered to a Trans-Mars Injection (TMI)
orbit by an in-space propulsion stage, which is not included in this analysis. After separating
from the in-space propulsion stage, the lander approaches Mars with a hyperbolic velocity
of 3,758 m/s and aerocaptures into a Mars one-solar day (1-Sol) parking orbit. After
aerocapture, the lander jettisons its aerocapture HIAD, deploys solar arrays, and loiters in
orbit for up to a year. When the lander is needed on the surface, it deploys the EDL HIAD,
makes a deorbit burn, and enters the Martian atmosphere. An artist’s conception of the
entry phase can be seen in Figure 3.7. In the hypersonic phase of entry, the lander uses trim
tabs on the EDL HIAD and its methane (CH4) and liquid oxygen (LOX) Reaction Control
System (RCS) for control. The lander takes advantage of atmospheric drag from its EDL
HIAD to slow down to supersonic speeds. The landers ignites its eight CH4-LOX main
engines at the proper time (typically at a speed of Mach 2-3) to reach to a vertical velocity
of 2.5 m/s when it is 12.5 m above the surface. The lander then descends at a constant rate
for 5 s until it lands safely. Once on Martian soil, the EDL HIAD will be retracted to allow
for crew and cargo to be offloaded.
3.4.3. HIAD Cost Estimate and SEER Model. A MEL for the HIAD lander
was obtained from the EDLAS team and used in conjunction with a document providing
technical descriptions of the associated hardware to produce a SEER model. The MEL was
broken down into 350 different components which translated into 179 work elements in
SEER4. The MEL and associated documents are not included in the present work because
4299 of the components came from an EXAMINE model of the MDM while the other 51 were from the
models of the aerocapture and EDLHIADs provided by the design team. For more information on EXAMINE
and the MDM see Section 4.2
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Figure 3.7. Baseline EDL ConOps (Aerocapture not shown).
they contain sensitive information that cannot be distributed freely. However, the mass of
the subsystems, and a breakdown of the normalized cost from the SEER estimate is provided
in Table. 3.3.
The HIAD and ADEPTMDMs are identical in design other than the scaling of their
components. However, there is a significant difference in the cost and mass of the HIAD
and ADEPT concepts despite the fact that the mass of the two HIADs is very similar to
the mass of ADEPT. The primary reason for this is that after aerocapture the aerocapture
HIAD is discarded removing over 4.2 t of mass from the system. This in turn reduces the
necessary mass of the structures, propellant tanks, propellant, and main engines yielding
a total savings of over 6 t. The decrease in size and mass of the structures and MPS also
yield a modest decrease in cost of those subsystems. However, the biggest cost savings
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Table 3.3. HIAD Mass and Normalized Cost Breakdown
Predicted Mass (kg) Development Production
Mission Systems Cost 0.855 14% 0.128 12%
Vehicle Systems Cost 1.795 29% 0.210 20%
Structure 4,078 14% 1.053 17% 0.201 20%
MPS 2,920 10% 0.530 8% 0.081 8%
RCS 1,427 5% 0.321 5% 0.064 6%
Power 1,217 4% 0.143 2% 0.037 4%
Avionics 347 1% 0.228 4% 0.052 5%
Thermal 487 2% 0.093 1% 0.009 1%
HIADs 8,383 29% 1.236 20% 0.246 24%
Dry Mass 18,859 64%
Propellant 10,298 35%
Vehicle Total 29,157 100% 6.253 100% 1.028 100%
Payload 20,000
TMI mass 49,157
compared to ADEPT is in the HIADs themselves. The two HIADs are nearly identical, the
only differences are the addition of a separation mechanism for the aerocapture HIAD, and
doors in the rigid nose section of the EDLHIAD to allow for the main engines to fire and the
landing legs to extend. This design replication offers a large savings during development.
There are also significantly fewer mechanisms and moving parts involved with the HIADs
as compared to ADEPT.
3.5. COMPARISON OF HIAD ADEPT AND COBRA–MRV
SEER’s uncertainty quantification capabilities were used to determine an 80% con-
fidence interval for each vehicle concept’s development and production costs shown in
Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 respectively. To do this a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000
trials was run within SEER assuming all full independence between the costs of the various
work elements. For more details on SEER’s Monte Carlo tool, see Appendix C. Of
the three vehicles HIAD, had the smallest range of uncertainty. This is primarily because
HIAD has already undergone two successful flight test as well as extensive ground testing
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Figure 3.8. Uncertainty in Development Cost for HIAD, ADEPT, and Cobra–MRV.
Figure 3.9. Uncertainty in First Unit Production Cost for HIAD, ADEPT, and Cobra–MRV.
with several prototypes being produced. This lowered the uncertainty of the mass estimates
used to estimate the cost of the vehicle. In addition, the development cost and development
cost risk are reduced because the vehicle carries two nearly identical HIADs. ADEPT and
Cobra–MRV has much wider uncertainty bounds because at this point their designs are less
mature than that of HIAD. As a result, their cost estimates have a larger uncertainty.
Of the three EDL vehicles whose costs were estimated, the Cobra–MRV had the
highest mass but lowest production cost, HIAD had the lowest mass and second lowest
production cost, while ADEPT had the second lowest mass and highest production cost.
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The development costs for HIAD and Cobra–MRVwere nearly identical while ADEPT was
about 26% higher. However, the ADEPT concept is extremely new in the design phase and
had very high margins put on all its components that may have unfairly affected its cost
estimate.
A detailed analysis of launch costs and the costs of varying sized in space propulsion
stages will be needed to determine whether the Cobra–MRV or HIAD concepts will be the
most cost effective over the course of a campaign. However, as private companies such
as SpaceX continue to offer cheaper and cheaper access to space it is likely that the low
cost/high mass Cobra–MRV will be the concept with the lowest overall cost. Note that each
of these vehicle concepts are sized to fit within the 10 m diameter payload fairing of the
SLS block 2 launch vehicle. While the Falcon Heavy rocket built by SpaceX technically
has the payload capacity required to lift each of these concepts to LEO none of these vehicle
concepts would fit inside its 5.2 m payload fairing[87]. The vehicles could be resized to fit
within the 8.4 m fairing of the SLS block 1B, however, this would negatively impact the
design of the vehicles[88].
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4. NEWMETHOD FOR SYSTEMS AND COST ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RATED
MARS ENTRY VEHICLES
The present section is derived heavily from a paper titled New Method for Systems
and Cost Analysis of Human Mars Entry Vehicles which has been accepted for publication
by the AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets. Before this paper was submitted to the
Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets it was peer reviewed by a panel of three subject matter
experts at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC).
4.1. INTRODUCTION TO AND MOTIVATION FOR SYSTEMS ANALYIS FOR
PLANETARY EDL-COST (SAPE-C)
One of the biggest obstacles to sending humans to Mars and safely returning them
to earth is cost[2, 3, 5]. When designing a new spacecraft, vehicle concepts are formulated
based on a data-driven and physics-based systems analysis. Meanwhile, design decisions
intended to reduce cost are often based on the assumption that lower mass equates to lower
cost, which is not true in all circumstances. The cost of a new vehicle concept is usually
modeled in a fairly static fashion; typically, a cost estimate is produced for a single conceptual
design after a trade study is completed. Thus, all other candidate designs in the tradespace
are ignored. A reason for this is that the user interfaces for cost estimating models make
cost tradespace exploration very time consuming by requiring users to manually change
each input to the model.
Often technology development programs are funded because it is believed that
they will reduce costs of future space missions. It is relatively easy to quantify how an
improved technology or capability will reduce cost on a component level, but to quantify
how that technology will affect the cost of a system requires a great amount of effort. For
example, improved aerothermal models and knowledge of the Martian atmosphere will
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allow engineers to reduce the safety margins on heatshield thickness. It is easy to model
how this will reduce the cost of the heatshield but difficult to model how it will reduce the
total cost of the entry system. Reduction in heatshield mass means less fuel is required to
carry the lander to the surface, which in turn reduces the size of the tanks and supporting
structures on the lander, reducing the cost further. Similarly, increasing the specific impulse
of the descent engines will likely increase the mass and cost of the engines but will reduce
the required fuel and tank size, decreasing the overall costs of the lander, but by how much?
Is it a better investment to improve aerothermal models to reduce heatshield mass, or would
the money be better spent improving engine technology? Would this answer change if the
required payloadwas increased by 50%or if mission planners required a different trajectory?
To answer these questions would require a massive effort using traditional cost modeling
tools.
The present section presents a novel approach to modeling cost for human Mars
Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) missions which bridges the gap between cost and
systems analysis models. This approach should drastically reduce the time spent by cost
estimators conducting trade studies allowing cost to be included in the systems analysis
tradespace for entry vehicle design. This approach is implemented via a Python-based
software tool known as System Analysis for Planetary EDL-Cost (SAPE-C). SAPE-C is
an addition to the Python based tool SAPE developed by Samareh et al.[89, 90] which is
in itself an integration of many systems analysis tools. The primary goal of SAPE-C is to
reduce the effort required by systems analysts in determining the impact that a new vehicle
configuration, or improved technology will have on the overall cost of a system. This
section will introduce the tool SAPE-C, and will show the effects various improvements
in technology or mission design parameters will have on the cost and cost uncertainty of
a Hypersonic Inflatable Aerodynamic Decelerator (HIAD) entry vehicle designed to carry
humans or cargo to the surface of Mars. The concept of operations (ConOps) of the vehicle
used in this study to demonstrate the capabilities of SAPE-C is a lander spacecraft equipped
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with an aerocapture HIAD, EDL HIAD, descent stage, and payload[91]. The baseline
HIAD entry vehicle and its ConOps are identical to the HIAD entry vehicle presented in
Section 3.4 of the previous section.
The following section describes the primary systems analysis tools that make up
SAPE, SAPE-C, and the methods used to tie them together. Section 5.3 presents the
results of using SAPE-C to analyze the cost of a HIAD entry vehicle. The tradespaces
explored include: payload vs ballistic coefficient (Secs. 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 4.3.3), payload
vs specific impulse (Section 4.3.4), and payload vs thrust-to-weight ratio (Section 4.3.5).
Section. 4.3.1 varies the ballistic coefficient during aerocapture and EDL together while
Secs. 4.3.2, and 4.3.3 vary them independently. Section 4.4 demonstrates the uncertainty
quantification capabilities of SAPE-C using the payload vs ballistic coefficient tradespace
from Section 4.3.1 as an example. Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes the present section,
provides concluding remarks, and discusses future work to be done to improve SAPE-C.
4.2. METHODS: SAPE, SAPE-C AND ASSOCIATED TOOLS
Mars entry vehicles are very complex and highly coupled systems with many com-
peting requirements and design variables. Changing the size or requirements of one com-
ponent of the vehicle will affect the size and requirements of many other components of
the entry vehicle. Understanding the tradespace of the design variables and the sensitivity
of the vehicle’s performance parameters to those variables is critical to the design decision
making process. Systems analysis and tradespace exploration provide a holistic view of a
new vehicle or mission concept by enabling decision makers to gain a better understanding
of how multiple design variables affect the vehicle as a whole. It is important that design
decisions are made based on quantitative data and not on intuition. When done properly
a systems analysis will use quantitative data to form verified models that show a systems
response to a number of different design variables and quantify the uncertainty of the
models. The traditional systems analysis process may take from several weeks to several
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years to complete. This can be significantly improved by automating and streamlining the
analysis process. These improvements can also reduce the errors resulting from manual
data transfer among discipline experts. The improved process will speed up the analysis and
design activities such as tradespace studies, sensitivity analyses, uncertainty quantification,
and vehicle optimization. However, automated systems analysis tools cannot replace the
role of discipline experts, as their input is required to check the accuracy of both the inputs
and outputs to the models.
The implementation of the systems analysis approach presented here is a modified
version of the Systems Analysis for Planetary EDL (SAPE) tool. SAPE is a Python-based
tool which combines a number of other software tools and vehicle analysis models, allowing
it to provide analysis on entry vehicle geometry, trajectory, aerothermodynamics, thermal
protection systems, and structure sizing[89, 90]. SAPE provides an integrated environment
so that a low-fidelity systems analysis and tradespace exploration can be performed in min-
utes, (not days or weeks) with sufficient hooks to perform high-fidelity analysis. SAPE has
many capabilities, but for the purposes of this study it is used to quickly produce a Master
Equipment List (MEL) and mass estimates of the vehicle’s components. An exploded view
of the HIAD entry vehicle analyzed in this work is shown in 4.1. This figure also shows
which models within SAPE are used to size the different portions of the vehicle. SAPE
contains a number of mass models for HIAD systems including flexible Thermal Protection
System (TPS)[92], inflatable structure[93, 94], inflation system[95], and rigid nose[96].
These models were created by consulting subject matter experts and using previous works.
For aerothermal prediction, SAPE uses the data generated by LAURA (Langley Aerother-
modynamic Upwind Relaxation Algorithm)[97] for the convective heating component and
HARA (High-Temperature Aerothermodynamic RAdiation)[98, 99, 100] for the radiative
heating component. In addition to the previously mentioned models, SAPE also integrates
the vehicle sizing tool EXAMINE (Exploration Architecture Model for the IN-space and
38
Figure 4.1. Exploded view of HIAD entry vehicle and system models used by SAPE.
Earth-to-orbit modeling)[101] for sizing the Mars Descent Module (MDM), and POST II
(Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II)[102] for modeling the trajectories and
determining fuel burn.
SAPE-C is a separate Python code, which integrates SAPE and the parametric
cost modeling software tool SEER-H (System Estimation and Evaluation of Resources-
Hardware). This allows the user to explore large tradespaces in vehicle design and see how
any variable affects the cost of the vehicle hardware. A flow chart showing a simplification
of the SAPE/SAPE-C algorithm is shown in Figure 4.2. The SAPE/SAPE-C algorithm
works as follows. First the user defines the initial orbit of the spacecraft and its design
parameters such as payload, ballistic coefficient, and specific impulse. An initial mass
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Figure 4.2. SAPE/SAPE-C Algorithm.
estimate of the vehicle as it arrives at Mars is then used to seed the SAPE algorithm. These
initial estimates and design parameters are written into an existing POST II input file. POST
II then calculates the required delta-V/propellant burned from the simulated trajectory. The
trajectory information is used in conjunction with LAURA and HARA to estimate the
radiative and convective heat fluxes that the TPS must withstand. SAPE then estimates
the required thickness of the HIAD TPS. The HIAD TPS thickness is used to estimate the
mass of the HIAD structures. EXAMINE then uses the estimated mass of the HIADs and
required propellants to estimate the masses all the components of the structures, thermal,
propulsion, and power subsystems on the MDM. The initial arrival mass minus the sum of
the masses of the MDM, HIADs and propellant is equal to the available payload mass. If
the available payload mass is significantly different from the required payload mass, then
an updated mass estimate will be input to POST again and the vehicle sizing process will
be repeated until the algorithm converges. The method used to update the vehicle mass
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and other properties is similar the Gauss-Seidel method. Once convergence is achieved,
the mass estimates of all the vehicle components are used by SAPE-C to generate a SEER
command file that is used to estimate the cost of the vehicle.
The three primary tools used by SAPE-C—POST II, EXAMINE, and SEER-H—are
briefly described in the following subsections.
4.2.1. Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST II). The Pro-
gram to Optimize Simulated Trajectories II (POST II) software is used by SAPE for flight
mechanics[102]. The Post II software is a generalized point mass, discrete parameter tar-
geting and optimization program that has been used extensively in past Mars missions such
as the Mars Exploration Rovers and Mars Science Laboratory. For this study, candidate
configurations were evaluated by modeling both aerocapture and EDL trajectories in Post
II. These simulations used standard Mars gravity, terrain and planet models, and the Mar-
tian atmosphere was modeled using the 2010 Mars Global Reference Atmospheric Model
(Mars-GRAM 2010). An aerodynamic database for a 70◦ sphere cone HIAD was incor-
porated into the Post II simulation, and the database consisted of axial and normal force
coefficient tables for a range of Mach and angle-of-attack values. EXAMINE determines
the mass of the MDM and SAPE determines the mass of the HIADs, which are summed
together with the payload and propellant masses to determine the TMI mass. The TMI mass
is then used as an input into POST II, which updates the estimate of the propellant mass
used by EXAMINE.
4.2.2. Exploration Architecture Model for the IN-space and Earth-to-orbit
modeling (EXAMINE). Exploration Architecture Model for the IN-space and Earth-to-
orbit modeling (EXAMINE) developed by D.R. Komar is an Excel-based tool for sizing
spacecraft and launch vehicles[101]. In SAPE it is used to generate a Master Equipment
List (MEL) of all components in the Mars Descent Module (MDM). The MDM is then
broken up into the following lander subsystems: Structures,Main Propulsion System (MPS),
Reaction Control System (RCS), Power, and Thermal Control System (TCS). EXAMINE
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models 41 individual components from these subsystems that are inputs to SEER. Some
examples of these components include: landing legs, fuel tank structure, fuel tank spray on
foam insulation, MPS fuel feed systems, helium pressurization storage system, solar arrays,
radiators, etc. One of the primary inputs to EXAMINE is Delta-V, which determines how
much fuel is required by the MPS and RCS during EDL.
4.2.3. System Estimation and Evaluation of Resources-Hardware (SEER-H).
This section describes how the MDM, aerocapture HIAD, and EDL HIAD are modeled in
SEER and how that model is integrated withing SAPE-C. For more information on how
SEER is used to model cost of future space hardware see Section 3.1 of the previous section.
A baseline model of the lander includingMDM, aerocapture HIAD, and EDLHIAD
was created in SEER. The model was broken down by subsystems, which include: Struc-
tures, Main Propulsion System (MPS), Reaction Control System (RCS), Power, Avionics,
Thermal Control System (TCS), Aerocapture HIAD, and EDL HIAD. In total 130 individ-
ual components of the lander were modeled in SEER including main engines, propellant
tanks, fuel feed systems, radiators, solar panels, individual layers of HIAD TPS, antennas,
and transponders, etc. EXAMINE and SAPE model more components than this, however,
Galorath’s SEER Space Guidance document recommends that certain components be rolled
up together and modeled as a single element[65]. Components from the Structures, MPS,
RCS, Power, and TCS were modeled using mass estimates from EXAMINE. Avionics were
modeled from the MEL produced by the Mars EDL Pathfinder study[103]. Note that the
avionics cost estimate only includes the hardware cost and not any costs associated with
developing the vehicle’s software. The HIADs are modeled using output from SAPE. For
all components, it was assumed there would be 2.3 prototypes, 1.3 prototypes for ground
testing and one full scale flight test. SEER uses fractional prototypes to represent proto-
types which do not have the full functionality of a production unit. For example, a structural
prototype or "boilerplate spacecraft" would be 0.5 prototypes, an engineering design unit
is considered 0.65 prototypes and a full scale unit flown in a flight test is considered 1
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prototype. A cost and mass breakdown of the baseline lander design by subsystem can be
seen in 4.3. While propellant makes up 37% of the landers mass, its cost is negligible
compared to the hardware costs and is not included in the cost estimate. Note that while
the mass of each subsystem is related to its cost, there is not a one-to-one correspondence
between the mass breakdown and the cost breakdown. The Vehicle Systems Cost shown in
4.3a is the cost of project management, systems engineering, and integration assembly and
test associated with the contractors building the vehicle. Any contractor award fees are not
included in the estimate. Mission Systems Costs represents NASAs project management,
systems engineering, and safety and mission assurance work.
Currently SAPE-C models how the cost of nearly every component of the entry
vehicle changes. Some additional work remains to model how the cost of a small number of
the components change. These components make up less than 10% of the total cost of the
baseline vehicle and include the main engines, as well as some components in the power,
(a) Production Cost Breakdown. (b) Mass Breakdown.
Figure 4.3. Production cost and mass breakdowns of baseline HIAD lander design.
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and TCS subsystems. As a result cost estimates presented in this work for vehicles with
payloads over 20 t will have their costs slightly underestimated while vehicles with payloads
under 20 t will be slightly overestimated.
4.3. RESULTS
The tradespaces explored in the present section include varying lander payload,
ballistic coefficient of both aerocapture and EDL HIADs, engine specific impulse, and
lander thrust-to-weight ratio. The results are primarily shown in contour plots with blue
and red coloration, blue represents a lower cost, mass or other variables while red represents
a higher cost, mass or other variable. This work is not focused on determining the absolute
cost of a campaign to Mars but rather how the relative cost changes as lander configuration
and vehicle performance parameters are varied. Because of this and the uncertainty in
the estimates of the exact costs, all costs presented have been normalized to the first unit
production cost of the baseline lander design. The baseline lander has a payload capacity
of 20 t, aerocapture and EDL HIADs with ballistic coefficients of 140 kg/m2, main engine
specific impulse of 360 s, and a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.5. In the following sections, the
effect of each of these variables on lander cost, mass, as well as the total cost and mass of
different Mars campaigns will be discussed. Section 4.3.1 gives an in depth analysis of all
the SAPE-C output as payload and ballistic coefficient are varied. This is followed by a
detailed discussion on the effect of the payload per lander and thus, the number of landers
on the total costs of aMars campaign as well as the total TMI mass. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3
isolate the effects that the ballistic coefficients of the aerocapture and EDL HIADs have on
the total lander cost and TMI mass. Finally, Secs. 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 explore the effects that
main engine specific impulse and thrust-to-weight ratio have on the total lander cost and
TMI mass.
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4.3.1. Introduction to SAPE-C Output:Payload vs. Ballistic Coefficient. This
section gives a detailed description of much of the SAPE-C output, and demonstrates
the capabilities of the tool using the payload vs. ballistic coefficient tradespace as an
example. The remaining sections will not be as detailed or discuss all the plots presented
here. However, all the plots presented for this tradespace will be available for the other
tradespaces in Appendix B.
A larger diameter HIAD creates a lower ballistic coefficient entry system. A lower
ballistic coefficient allows more of the landers energy to be dissipated through drag and
requires less propellant to be carried on the spacecraft. As a result of the reduced propellant
requirements the tanks, thermal control systems, and structures all reduce in size, mass, and
cost. However, at a point the additional mass and cost of a larger HIAD outweighs the mass
and cost reductions from the other subsystems. In this tradespace, the ballistic coefficient
of both the aerocapture (AC) and EDL HIADs are kept equal to each other and varied from
100 to 180 kg/m2.
Figures 4.4a and 4.4b show the development cost and the production cost of the
first unit for a lander with a given payload capacity and ballistic coefficient. All costs
are normalized to the first unit production cost of the baseline lander design, which has a
payload of 20 t and a ballistic coefficient of 140 kg/m2. Development cost includes all costs
associated with the design and test of a lander configuration including building and testing
prototypes. First unit production cost includes all the costs associated with building the
first flight unit. As each additional lander flight unit is produced, the workers building the
lander gain experience, work more efficiently, and thus, the production cost decreases. In
SEER this is modeled using Wright’s Cumulative Average Model given by Eq. 4.1.






Figure 4.4. Payload vs. Ballistic Coefficient Trades.
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The term Pi is the first unit production cost, N is the total number of units produced,
Pn is the total cost to produce the N units, and b is a scaling factor between 0 and 1 that
determines how much the cost is reduced for each additional unit produced. In SEER each
component has its own b value determined by SEER’s proprietary database and algorithms.
Figure 4.4c shows the total cost to build five landers. The total cost is simply the sum of the
development cost and the production cost to build five landers given by Eq 4.1. Note that
for all configurations development cost is between 6.3 and 6.6 times the first unit production
cost. For the b values given by SEER, this means eleven landers must be produced before
the production costs are greater than the development costs. There is some variation, but
this trend is relatively constant throughout this work.
In Figures 4.4a, 4.4b, and 4.4c the primary cost driver is the payload carried by the
lander. Moving from left to right along the x-axis, the payload increases and so does the
cost. The ballistic coefficient is varied along the y-axis. For a lander with a given payload,
increasing the ballistic coefficient from 100 kg/m2 initially causes the costs decrease until
they reach a minimum at a ballistic coefficient between 150 and 160 kg/m2. Increasing the
ballistic coefficient further causes the costs to increase again.
Figure 4.4d shows how the TMI (Trans-Mars Injection) mass changes with varying
payload and ballistic coefficient. TMI mass is the mass of the lander with its payload when
it is sent on its trajectory from Earth to Mars. Previous studies have focused on minimizing
the TMI mass, assuming that minimizing TMI mass will minimize cost[2]. However,
Figures 4.4a, 4.4b, and 4.4c show that the lander hardware cost for a given payload is
minimized at ballistic coefficients between 150 and 160 kg/m2 while 4.4d shows the TMI
mass is minimized for ballistic coefficients around 120 kg/m2. For a lander with 20 t payload
capacity decreasing the ballistic coefficient from 160 to 120 will decrease TMI mass by
1.73%, but increase the total cost to develop and produce five landers by 1.70%. None of
the costs in 4.4 include the cost of launching the lander from Earth or transporting it to
Mars. That cost will depend on the design of the in-space propulsion stage which will be
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sized to the lander TMI mass. However, for previous missions the cost of delivering the
vehicle to Mars was small compared to the cost of the lander hardware. For example, the
Atlas V launch vehicle which launched MSL from Earth to its TMI orbit was only 17% the
cost of the EDL vehicle[104]. Determining the effect of TMI mass on the total campaign
cost is an important question but it is out of scope of this work.
The effects of lander payload and ballistic coefficient on the sizing of the aerocapture
and EDL HIADs are shown in Figures 4.4e and 4.4f. The tradespace covers a wide range of
HIAD diameters ranging from 12 to 26 m. The cost and TMI mass differences in a lander
with ballistic coefficient of 160 vs 120 kg/m2 are explained by the difference in HIAD
diameters. Changing the ballistic coefficient of a lander with 20 t payload from 160 to 120
requires increasing the aerocapture HIAD diameter by 2.4 m and the EDL HIAD diameter
by 2.2 m. The increase in HIAD diameter significantly reduces the required propellant,
which is inexpensive, but increases the area of the aerocapture HIAD by 65 m2 and the area
of the EDL HIAD by 56 m2, which are much more costly.
For any human Mars campaign, multiple landers will be required to deliver all the
necessary equipment and provisions to the surface. Building a large number of smaller
payload landers reduces the development cost, and production costs are reduced by pro-
ducing multiple of the same unit. However, 4.4g shows that the cost per ton of payload
is significantly reduced by increasing the payload per lander. Furthermore, 4.4j shows the
gear ratio is also significantly reduced using landers with larger payloads. The gear ratio
is the TMI mass divided by the payload mass and corresponds to the mass efficiency of
the lander. A lower gear ratio means a higher percentage of the total mass sent to Mars
is payload. Figures 4.4h and 4.4i show the total cost of lander hardware to deliver 100 t
and 200 t of payload to the Martian surface. In each of these plots, there are several local
minimums and discontinuities. The discontinuities are a result of the how the landers are
packed. For example, to deliver 100 t of payload it is very inefficient to design a lander with
a 24 t payload capacity as five landers will need to be built each with 4 t of unused payload
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capacity. If instead 25 t payload landers are used, there will be no wasted capacity and only
four landers need to be built. Figure 4.4h contains eight local minimums corresponding to
the payloads that evenly divide 100. The most notable of these minimums are at 33.3, 25,
20, 16.7, and 14.3 t with the global minimum at 20 t. In 4.4i where the total payload to
Mars has been doubled, the global minimum has shifted to 25 t. Figures 4.4k and 4.4l show
the total TMI mass for campaigns sending 100 and 200 t to Mars, respectively. Again, the
local minimums are at lander payloads that evenly divide 100 and 200. However, unlike
Figures 4.4h and 4.4i the global minimums correspond to the maximum lander payload that
evenly divides the campaign payload. The campaign payload is the total payload delivered
to mars from several landers. These trends are more clearly illustrated in 4.5.
Figure 4.5 includes every possible efficiently packed combination of landers, with
individual payloads varying from 10-40 t, to deliver campaign payloads of 100, 150, 200,
250, or 300 t of to the surface of Mars. All costs in 4.5 are normalized to the first unit
production cost of the baseline lander design.
Figures 4.5a and 4.5b show the total lander hardware costs as a function of payload
per lander and number of landers. Note that for each campaign payload, increasing the
payload per lander and decreasing the number of landers initially significantly reduces
the total cost. As the payload per lander is increased further, (and number of landers
decreased) the total lander hardware cost reaches a minima and then increases. A slightly
different trend is shown in Figures 4.5c and 4.5d. Figures 4.5c and 4.5d show the total
TMI mass over the campaign as a function of payload per lander and number of landers.
In Figures 4.5c and 4.5d as the payload per lander is increased (and number of landers
decreased) the total TMI mass continuously decreases.
There are several important takeaways from 4.5.
1. Minimizing TMI mass does not always minimize lander hardware cost.
2. The TMI mass will always be minimized by maximizing the payload per lander and




Figure 4.5. Effects of lander payload on total cost and TMI mass for several possible
multi-mission Mars campaigns.
3. Smaller lander designs are more cost effective for smaller campaigns sending less
payload to Mars. Larger lander designs favor larger campaigns.
4. The majority of minimum cost lander designs have payloads between 20 and 30 t.
5. The total lander hardware cost is not very sensitive to the payload per lander in the
vicinity of the minimum cost option. Meaning that there are many options for lander
design that are not much more expensive than the minimum cost option. For example,
10 landers is the minimum cost option for a 300 t campaign, but the options sending
8-14 landers are all within 2% of the minimum cost option.
50
6. Larger campaigns are significantly more cost efficient. For example, sending 300 t to
Mars only cost about 50 % more than sending 100 t.
Figure 4.6a shows the minimum cost payload per lander and number of landers for any
campaign sending 40-800 t of payload to Mars. In other words 4.6a shows what all
minimum cost options from Figures 4.5a and 4.5b would be if Figures 4.5a and 4.5b
included all campaigns from 40-800 t. The discontinuities in 4.6a represent where it is
(a) Payload per lander and number of landers to
minimize lander hardware costs over a campaign.
(b) Total lander hardware cost over campaign and
hardware costs per ton of payload delivered.
Figure 4.6. Considerations for a range of Mars campaign sizes.
advantageous to increase the number of landers by one and reduce the payload per lander
accordingly. Figure. 4.6a also shows that there is no cost advantage to building landers
with payloads over 40 t unless the campaign is sending over 720 t of payload to the surface.
Figure 4.6b shows how the cost per ton of payload and the total lander hardware cost vary
for campaigns sending 40-800 t of payload to Mars. Note that the cost of delivering one ton
of payload to the surface drops significantly as the total payload of the campaign increases.
It also shows that the total cost associated with developing and building the lander hardware
to deliver 800 t to the surface of Mars is only 23 times the first unit production cost of the
baseline 20 t payload lander.
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4.3.2. Payload vs. Ballistic Coefficient of Aerocapture HIAD. In Section 4.3.1
the ballistic coefficient of both the aerocapture and EDL HIADs were varied but kept equal
to each other. In this tradespace the Ballistic coefficient of the EDL HIAD is kept constant
at 140 kg/m2 while the aerocapture HIADs ballistic coefficient is varied from 100 to 180,
and the payload capacity of the lander is varied from 10 to 40 t.
Figure 4.7 shows that in contrast to the results in Section 4.3.1 both the cost and
mass are minimized by maximizing the ballistic coefficient of the aerocapture HIAD. This
makes intuitive sense, as during aerocapture the main engines are not used so nothing
material is gained or lost by changing the aerocapture HIAD diameter. At higher ballistic
coefficients, the vehicle must descend deeper into the Martian atmosphere and experiences
a higher heat load. The increased heat load is mitigated by increasing the thickness of the
flexible TPS. However, this work does not take into account after-body heating. The current
models assume no backshell and only some light TPS at the rear of the spacecraft. Recent
work has shown that radiative heating on the after-body of a spacecraft can be significant,
exceed convective heating, and is highly dependent on angle of attack[105][106]. Since the
vehicle is controlled by altering its angle of attack via trim tabs, after-body radiative heating
could pose a significant risk to the payload if larger ballistic coefficients are used. As HIAD
(a) (b)
Figure 4.7. Lander payload and aerocapture HIAD ballistic coefficient tradespace.
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diameter decreases with higher ballistic coefficients, the risk of an infeasible lander design
increases. Adding a backshell to mitigate this risk would be a significant added cost and
operational problem. The backshell would have to be removed or open up for crew and
cargo to be unloaded. Removing the backshell in flight requires a separation mechanism
that ensures it does not recontact the lander or land on any assets already on the Martian
surface. A backshell that opens up once the lander has reached the surface will add mass to
the vehicle and make offloading large cargo a challenge.
The complete set of SAPE-C output for the payload vs. aerocapture ballistic coeffi-
cient tradespace can be seen in 1 in Appendix B.
4.3.3. Payload vs. Ballistic Coefficient of EDL HIAD. In this tradespace the
Ballistic coefficient of the aerocapture HIAD is kept constant at 140 kg/m2 while the EDL
HIAD ballistic coefficient is varied from 100 to 180 and the payload capacity of the lander
is varied from 10 to 40 t. Figure 4.8a shows that the minimum cost configuration is when
the EDL HIAD has a ballistic coefficient of 130 kg/m2. However, 4.8a also shows that from
ballistic coefficients of 105 to 150 kg/m2 the cost varies less than 0.5%. 4.8b shows that for
a given payload, the TMI mass continues to decrease as the ballistic coefficient decreases.
Depending on how the cost of the in-space propulsion stage delivering the lander to TMI
(a) (b)
Figure 4.8. Lander payload and EDL HIAD ballistic coefficient tradespace.
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orbit varies with TMI mass, it may be more cost effective to build a lander with an EDL
HIAD ballistic coefficient below 130 kg/m2.
The complete set of SAPE-C output for the payload vs. EDL ballistic coefficient
tradespace can be seen in 2 in Appendix B.
4.3.4. Payload vs. Specific Impulse. This tradespace examines the effect of the
specific impulse of the landers eight main engines on lander cost and TMImass. SEER does
not have the capability to accurately estimate how changing the specific impulse of an engine
will affect its cost. However, SAPE can size all other lander components as the propellant
requirements change. Increasing the specific impulse of the main engines results in lower
propellant mass, which in turn reduces the total mass of the lander as well as the mass and
cost of the tanks, structures, thermal control systems, and several other subsystems. This
trade does not take into account the additional costs or mass of improving the engines to
operate at higher specific impulses, only the effects on other lander subsystems.
Figure 4.9 shows the payload vs. specific impulse tradespace. The eight CH4-LOX
main engines of the lander are assumed to have a nominal specific impulse of 360 s, which
is varied ±10% from 324 to 396. Figure 4.9a shows an approximately linear decrease in
(a) (b)
Figure 4.9. Lander payload and specific impulse tradespace.
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cost as specific impulse increases. On average, increasing specific impulse by 1% results
in a 0.17% reduction in lander cost and a 0.22% decrease in TMI mass. Given the massive
expense of a humans to Mars campaign, a 0.17% cost decrease is a considerable savings.
The complete set of SAPE-C output for the payload vs. specific impulse tradespace
can be seen in 3 in Appendix B.
4.3.5. Payload vs. Thrust-to-Weight Ratio. Increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio
of the main engines allows the lander to come to a stop more quickly during its terminal
descent phase and use less propellant, thereby reducing the required size of the propellant
tanks, support structures, and cooling systems of the lander. The effect the thrust-to-weight
ratio has on the cost and TMI mass is highly coupled as seen in 4.10.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.10. Lander payload and thrust-to-weight ratio tradespace.
Figure 4.10a shows that increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio above 1.5 is extremely
beneficial. Increasing the Thrust-to-Weight ratio from 1.5 to 1.75 decreases the total
production cost of the vehicle by 1.3%, and increasing it further to 2.0 decreases the
production cost by 1.9%. However, increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio beyond 2.0 has
diminishing returns. To get a 3% decrease in cost, the thrust-to-weight ratio must be
increased to 2.75. Increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio to 4.0 only achieves a 3.6% cost
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reduction. It should be noted that at this point SAPE-C does not model the effect of engine
thrust on the cost of the landers engine. The cost reductions seen here will have to be
balanced against the additional cost and mass of larger more powerful engines.
The complete set of SAPE-C output for the payload vs. thrust-to-weight ratio
tradespace can be seen in 4 in Appendix B.
4.4. UNCERTAINTY QUANTIFICATION CAPABILITIES OF SAPE-C
The goal of this section is to demonstrate the uncertainty quantification capabilities
of SAPE-C. With any space mission, it is essentially impossible to predict the cost with
complete accuracy because of the many sources of uncertainty. A primary source of
uncertainty in the preliminary design phase of a mission is the uncertainty in the mass of
the spacecraft and each of its components. In the present work, uncertainty in the mission
cost due to uncertainty in the mass of the spacecraft’s components is referred to as "mass
uncertainty." Many other sources of uncertainty in the cost of a space mission are intangible
items which are difficult to quantify such as delays in funding, political hurdles, volatility
of goals and requirements, uncertainty in the maturity of a technology, or prolonged launch
delays due to any number of external factors. These kinds of uncertainties are referred to
as "mission uncertainties."
While it is impossible to accurately predict the exact cost of a space mission, it may
be possible to accurately predict the distribution of possible costs with uncertainty analysis.
As stated previously, SEER outputs the values of a CDF at 10% intervals. Thus, the range
from the 10% probability level to the 90% probability level is the 80% Confidence Interval
(CI). In a previous study by Friz et al., the CIs obtained with SEER have been validated for
different space missions.[66].
SAPE-C can output an absolute CI and a relative CI. The absolute CI, Ca is defined
as
Ca = x90 − x10 (4.2)
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where x90 is the cost estimate at the 90% confidence level, and x10 is the cost estimate at





where x50 is the cost estimate at the 50% confidence level which was also used as the point
estimates presented in Section 5.3.
Figure 4.11 shows the absolute and relative CIs of the first unit production cost for
the baseline lander design as payload and ballistic coefficient are varied. Figures 4.11a
and 4.11b show the uncertainty in cost due only to the uncertainty in the mass modeling,
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.11. Uncertainty for the payload vs ballistic coefficient tradespace.
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while Figures 4.11c and 4.11d show the uncertainty in cost due to all mission factors.
Both the mass and mission CI follow the same trend as the first unit production cost seen in
Figure 4.4b. As the mass of the payload per lander increases so does the first unit production
cost and the first unit production cost CI. Similarly, both the first unit production cost and its
CI are minimized at ballistic coefficients near 160 kg/m2. However, the relative confidence
interval follows a much different trend. Overall, the relative CI does not vary significantly
with ballistic coefficient or payload. The total variation in 4.11b is about 2% and in 4.11d
is less than 6%. These variations are an order of magnitude smaller than the variations seen
in Figures 4.11a and 4.11c. Interestingly, the relative mission CI does decrease slightly with
increasing payload, which is opposite of the absolute CI trend. However, the major take
away from comparing relative and absolute uncertainty is that while the absolute uncertainty
increases as lander payload increases the relative uncertainty does not, meaning there is no
additional cost risk associated with larger payload landers.
4.5. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM SAPE-C ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR FUTUREWORK
SAPE-C, the new extension to the systems analysis tool SAPEwas presented. SAPE-
C allows the user to quickly determine the effect that an improved technology or change in
vehicle configuration will have on the cost of an entire vehicle. By linking the output of
several systems analysis tools with the commercial cost estimating software SEER, SAPE-C
is able to model costs in a dynamic way not possible with traditional costing tools. This
work used SAPE-C to explore the effects of payload, ballistic coefficients, main engine
specific impulse, and main engine thrust-to-weight ratio on the total hardware cost of a
HIAD entry vehicle.
It was determined that lander hardware costs are not always minimized by minimiz-
ing the TMI mass. Payload per lander is the factor which has the largest impact on lander
hardware costs over a campaign. Designing a lander to carry more payload decreases its
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gear ratio making it more mass efficient, in addition the first unit production cost per ton of
payload also decreases. However, this also increases the development cost and reduces the
cost efficiency of building multiple identical units. The payload per lander that minimizes
lander hardware costs is dependent upon the total payload being delivered to Mars, and
trends to higher payloads per lander as the total campaign payload increases. In contrast, to
minimize TMI mass, the payload per lander should be made as large as possible.
The cost of a lander with a given payload can be minimized by designing the ballistic
coefficient of the aerocapture HIAD to be as large as possible without requiring a backshell
or putting the vehicle at risk. In contrast, a large EDL HIAD with a smaller ballistic
coefficient can reduce propulsion requirements and costs. Costs are minimized when the
EDL HIAD’s ballistic coefficient is around 130 kg/m2. Decreasing the ballistic coefficient
of the EDL HIAD below 130 kg/m2 will increase the cost of the lander hardware but also
decrease the TMI mass.
Specific impulse also has a significant effect on cost. For every 1% that specific
impulse is raised, it reduces lander costs by 0.17% and TMI mass by 0.22%. Improving
CH4-LOX engines to increase specific impulse will reduce costs as long as the cost of
improving the engines and extra mass from extending nozzles does not outweigh the cost
and mass savings. Increasing engine thrust to allow a higher thrust-to-weight ratio can
also reduce cost. However, this study was not able to determine the thrust-to-weight ratio
that minimized cost as SAPE-C is currently not modeling how a number of key propulsion
components are changing with thrust.
In this section, the uncertainty quantification capabilities of SAPE-C were also
demonstrated. SAPE-C is capable of generating at Confidence Interval (CI) for each
estimate in the tradespace. It was determined that while the size of the CIs increase as
the payload of the lander increases the CI relative to an estimates median cost stays fairly
constant.
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The primary item for future work is modeling the effect of TMI mass on the mission
cost. To model the effect of TMI mass on campaign cost would require modeling a
propulsion stage in both EXAMINE and SEER where the prime input to the vehicle sizing
would be TMI mass. Ideally, several propulsion concepts would be modeled and compared
so that the effect of the propulsion technology on the cost can also be studied. Reducing the
total TMI mass across the campaign by increasing lander payload and HIAD diameters will
reduce the cost of transporting the landers to Mars but may not reduce the total campaign
costs. As the cost of access to space continues to decreases so will the benefit of reducing
TMI mass.
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5. BLIND VALIDATION STUDY OF PARAMETRIC COST ESTIMATION TOOL
SEER-H FOR NASA SCIENCE MISSIONS
The present is derived heavily from a paper titled Blind Validation Study of Para-
metric Cost Estimation Tool SEER-H for NASA Science Missions which is currently being
reviewed for publication by the journal Acta Astronautica. Before being submitted to Acta
Astronautica this paper was peer reviewed by a panel of three subject matter experts at
NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) and has cleared LaRC’s Technical Publication
Submittal and Approval System (TPSAS).
5.1. INTRODUCTION TO ANDMOTIVATION FOR VALIDATION STUDY
Parametric cost estimation tools are commonly used both at NASA and in industry
to predict life cycle costs of space systems[52, 107, 108]. Parametric costing tools are
software packages that use regression analysis to relate quantitative technical parameters
and qualitative nontechnical parameters to cost[51]. Examples of quantitative technical
parameters include mass, volume, and part count. Nontechnical parameters are equally
important but are difficult to measure and or subjective items such as complexity, level of
new design, and team experience. Parametric costing tools allow users to quickly estimate
the costs of a mission before detailed designs have been completed. Typically, they are
used to estimate the development and production costs of hardware early in the project
life-cycle, including mission concept studies (Pre-Phase A), concept development (Phase
A), and preliminary design (Phase B). Parametric costing tools are also used to perform
trade studies and predict costs of design variations and are frequently used to generate
independent cost estimates to evaluate mission proposals.
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One of the primary costing tools used by NASA to evaluate mission, spacecraft,
and instrument proposals is SEER Hardware Estimation and Life Cycle Cost Analysis
(SEER-H) by Galorath Inc., henceforth referred to as simply SEER[53]. To date, no
independent validation of SEER for estimating the cost of space missions has been reported
in the literature. Galorath performed their own internal validation studies of SEER, and
reported the results of these studies without details on the methods used to perform the
validations[63]. The primary goal of the study performed by Galorath appears to have been
to develop standard inputs and assumptions to model various space hardware rather than
to validate the model against actual costs. These input assumptions are documented in
the SEER-H Space Guidance document, an extremely valuable resource for anyone using
SEER to estimate the cost of a space system[65].
Galorath’s validation study of SEER consisted of fifteen case studies of various
robotic NASA spacecraft, and included modeling 46 instruments[63]. Both Galorath’s
study and the present study make use of the Electro-Optical System (EOS) and Integrated
Circuit (IC) plug-ins for SEER. Galorath provides little information on how the study was
conducted other than the names of the missions used and that "A standardized modeling
approach was utilized, which formed the basis of a Space Guidance document to be released
in the future." The SEER Space Guidance document has since been released and was used
to form the SEER estimates in the present study[65]. Of the fifteen missions in the SEER
study, seven were Discovery, six were Explorer, and two were New Frontiers. Discovery
classmissions are low-cost solar system explorationmissions typically cost capped at around
$300 million. Explorer class missions are even lower cost and are typically capped at $200
million. New Frontiers missions are larger than Discovery and Explorer missions, but are
not as expensive as flagship missions. New Frontiers missions typically are cost capped
under $1 billion. Galorath’s study found that over the fifteen missions SEER’s average error
in predicting cost was -1% with a standard deviation of 19%. Therefore, roughly 68% of all
SEER estimates will be from -20% to +18% of the actual costs and 95% of estimates will
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be from -39% to +37%, assuming the mean values of SEER estimates follow a Gaussian
distribution. It is not known whether or not the estimators in Galorath’s study knew the
mission costs before performing their estimates so that they could provide guidance to
customers on how to adjust inputs, or if they conducted the study in a blind manner to
validate their models.
There are several important differences between the present study and the Galorath
study. It appears the primary goal of the Galorath study was to determine a standard set
of inputs and settings which would produce the most accurate results when modeling the
cost of a space mission. The goal of the present study was to independently assess the
accuracy of SEER in an environment that matches that of an independent cost estimate as
closely as possible. The Galorath study used technical data about the spacecraft and payload
designs from the end of the mission; whereas the present study used technical data from
each mission’s Critical Design Review (CDR). In other words, the Galorath study modeled
the spacecraft as they were built, while the present study modeled how the spacecraft
were expected to be built at the time of CDR. As a result, errors in the cost estimates of
the Galorath study are primarily due to the uncertainty introduced by SEER and how the
hardware is modeled in SEER, whereas the present study also includes uncertainty in the
design of the spacecraft at CDR. Thus, the Galorath study shows how accurate SEER can
be, whereas the present study endeavors to show how accurate SEER is likely to be when
used in its typical use case. This required that the estimators have no prior information of
the mission cost, so that cognitive biases could be minimized.
The methodology of the present study is further described in 5.2. Section 5.3
presents the results of the present study, 5.4 discusses factors which may have affected the
results of the present study that are independent of SEER, and 5.5 provides the conclusions
of the present study.
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5.2. METHODOLOGY
For the present study, twelve missions were selected from the One NASA Cost
Engineering (ONCE) database. ONCE is a database maintained by NASA, which stores
technical and managerial documents presented at major design reviews for NASAmissions.
These documents include the Master Equipment List (MEL) for each spacecraft, technical
descriptions of the spacecraft components, and records of how much money was spent
on the mission. This information is captured in documents know as Cost Analysis Data
Requirements (CADRes). CADRes are a set of three documents recording:
1. An overview of the mission.
2. A mass and power breakdown.
3. A cost breakdown by subsystem and year.
CADRes are typically generated at each major review for a mission; such as, the Mission
Concept Review (MCR), Critical Design Review (CDR), Launch Readiness Review (LRR),
End of Mission (EOM), and potentially others. The present study used the technical data,
MELs, hardware descriptions etc., from the CDR to generate cost estimates and compared
them with their actual costs at either LRR or EOM, depending on which data set was
available. This differs from Galorath’s study, where LRR/EOM technical data was used to
generate estimates that were compared to the same LRR/EOM costs. The present study
used the data from CDR in part because the documents produced at CDR typically go
into significantly more technical detail than the documents produced at other phases of the
mission. Using the information available at CDR as opposed to LRR/EOM is also a more
realistic test of the capabilities of SEER since no estimator will know the final design when
producing an independent cost estimate. Using CDR data was also done to review the
standard mass margin estimation assumptions discussed in 5.4.1.
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The present study was conducted in the followingmanner. Cost estimator A selected
the missions and removed all references to cost from the CADRes and supporting technical
documents. These cleansed documents were then given to estimators B and C who used
them to produced SEER cost estimates. Estimators B and C were blind to (i.e., unaware
of) the actual mission costs in order to prevent cognitive biases, such as anchoring, from
influencing their cost estimates. Anchoring is a cognitive bias that can cause an individual
to rely too heavily on an initial piece of information when making decisions. Estimator
A was an advanced SEER user and experienced cost estimator. Estimators B and C were
novice SEER users, but were trained for several weeks before the start of the study.
The cost of every mission in this study was broken down into the standard NASA
space missionWork Breakdown Structure (WBS) shown in Figure 5.1. SEER is not capable
of estimating the cost of every WBS element. SEER can only estimate the costs associated
with Project Management (PM), Systems Engineering (SE), Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA), Payload, Spacecraft Bus, and Systems Integration, Assembly, and Test (IAT),
which correspond to the standard NASA WBS items 1-3, 5, 6, and 10, respectively. Esti-
mates of WBS 4, 7-9, and 11: Science/Technology, Mission Operations, Launch Vehicle,
Figure 5.1. Standard NASA space mission Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
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Ground Systems, and Education and Public Outreach respectively, were not included in
this study. Additionally, no software costs were included in this study. The costs of the
Spacecraft Bus were broken down into the following subsystems: structures, thermal con-
trol, propulsion, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C), communications, electrical
power, harness, and Command and Data Handling (C&DH). The majority, but not all, of the
missions have their costs broken down in this manner, with the exceptions being attributed
to data limitations. The costs included in this study are only those in mission phases B
(Preliminary Design & Technology Completion), C (Final Design & Fabrication), and D
(System Assembly, Integration & Test).
To ensure that proper comparisons were being made with the actual mission costs all
cost estimates were converted to real-year dollars using the 2017 NASA New Start Inflation
Index. As the costs of various payloads/subsystems are sometimes sensitive/proprietary, all
costs presented in the present section have been normalized.
There are three main factors that determine the accuracy of a spacecraft hardware
cost estimate using parametric cost estimating tools:
1. The accuracy and precision of the tool used to model the cost,
2. The quality and quantity of the technical data describing the hardware,
3. The knowledge, experience, and skill of the cost estimator using the cost modeling
tool and evaluating the data.
The goal of the present study is to test the first factor, while minimizing the contributions of
the second and third factors. Both the present study and the validation study performed by
Galorath Inc. use CADRes and supporting data from ONCE. However, for many missions
there are a large number of technical documents with varying detail so there may be some
slight inconsistencies between the various documents used to build the estimates. It is
worth noting that although the CADRes contain significant quantities of data they do not
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contain every single piece required to complete a parametric cost estimate. Inevitably, the
estimators were required to interpret limited data or make assumptions where data was
missing.
The missions for the present study were selected from recent robotic NASA science
missions which have complete CADRes on the NASA ONCE Database and sufficient
supporting technical documentation to build a credible estimate. Figure 5.2 shows the
missions selected for the present study, which include: IBEX, CONTOUR, WISE, New
Horizons, MESSENGER, GRAIL, Deep Impact, MAVEN, Dawn, Kepler, SMAP, and
Juno. Table 5.1 summarizes the class and destination of each of the missions included in
the present study.
This selection represents a wide variety of robotic spacecraft types including earth
orbiting, planetary, and space telescopes. The Interstellar Boundary EXplorer (IBEX) was
a small Explorer class mission in earth orbit designed to study the interaction of solar wind
and interstellar medium[109]. COmet Nucleus TOUR (CONTOUR) was a Discovery class
mission managed by the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL) which was to flyby
three comets[110]. Unfortunately, shortly after initiating the burn towards its first comet,
the heat generated by the solid rocket weakened the aluminum support structures holding
the motor in place causing them to fail. As a result the spacecraft was lost[111]. Wide-
field Infrared Survey Explorer(WISE) was a small (400 cm) space telescope in low earth
orbit which imaged the entire sky in multiple infrared bands. The WISE mission was an
Explorer class mission managed by the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)[112]. New
Horizons was a New Frontiers mission managed by APL, the spacecraft was the first to
flyby the planet Pluto. MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging
(MESSENGER) was a Discovery class mission and was the first spacecraft to orbit the
planet Mercury[113]. Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) was a Discovery
class mission managed by JPL made up of two small spacecraft orbiting and mapping the
gravitational field of the moon to determine its interior structure[114]. Deep Impact was
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(j) Kepler (k) SMAP (l) Juno
Figure 5.2. Spacecraft included in the validation study.
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Table 5.1. Summary of missions included in the present study.
Mission Class Destination
IBEX Explorer Earth Orbit
CONTOUR Discovery Three Comets
WISE Explorer Earth Orbit
New Horizons New Frontiers Pluto
MESSENGER Discovery Mercury
GRAIL Discovery The Moon
Deep Impact Discovery Comet 9P Tempel
MAVEN Discovery Mars
Dawn Discovery Vesta and Ceres
Kepler Discovery Earth Orbit
SMAP Earth Science Earth Orbit
Juno New Frontiers Jupiter
a Discovery class mission managed by JPL. The mission was made up of two spacecraft,
one which impacted comet Tempel 1 and a second which observed the impact[115]. Mars
Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) was a mission from theMars Scout Program
(The Mars Scout program was later rolled into the Discovery program). The Principal
Investigator (PI) was at University of Colorado Boulders’s Laboratory for Atmospheric and
Space Physics (LASP) while Goddard Spaceflight Center (GSFC) managed the project.
MAVEN’s primary objectives were to explore the interaction of the Sun and the solar wind
with Mars’s magnetosphere and atmosphere to learn more about how Mars lost much of
its atmosphere and surface water[116]. Dawn was a Discovery class mission managed
by JPL with significant contributions from the space agencies of Italy, Germany, France
and the Netherlands. The spacecraft orbited the planet Ceres, and the asteroid Vesta,
and was the first to orbit two extraterrestrial bodies, and was the first NASA exploration
mission to utilize ion propulsion[117]. Kepler was a Discovery class mission, the PI
was at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) and the mission was managed by JPL. The
spacecraft was a wide field space telescope capable of continuously monitoring 100,000
stars at once to detect transiting exoplanets[118]. Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) was
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an earth science mission managed by JPL. The spacecraft supports a rotating 6-m diameter
lightweight deployable mesh reflector which is used by the spacecraft’s active radar and
passive radiometer to measure global soil moisture[119]. Juno was a New Frontiers class
mission to the planet Jupiter. Juno’s PI was at Southwest Research Institute(SwRI) while
the mission was managed at JPL. Juno’s mission was to learn more about the origin, interior,
atmosphere and Magnetosphere of Jupiter[120].
Not all CADRes included sufficient technical details about mission payloads, usually
this occurred in cases where payload instruments were contributed, or paid for by other
space agencies or universities. All the spacecraft included in this study carried multiple
instruments but Dawn and New Horizons did not have enough supporting documentation
to build credible estimates of their payload costs. Thus, Dawn and New Horizons payload
costs have been omitted form this study.
5.3. RESULTS OF BLIND STUDY
This section presents the results of the blind portion of the studywhere the estimators
had no knowledge of the actual costs of the missions. The next section ( 5.4) discusses
these blind results but also presents some non-blind results generated after the preliminary
analysis of the blind portion of this study was complete.
While the total cost of a mission is public information, often the cost of specific
pieces of hardware is proprietary or otherwise sensitive information. In order to protect
against any potential breach of sensitive information all results of this study are expressed





Where ε is the percent error, CE is the estimated cost, and CA is the actual cost from the
CADRe data.
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SEER outputs the cost of each spacecraft/payload component individually and out-
puts system level costs for groups of components know in SEER as roll-ups. System level
costs are broken into project management (PM), systems engineering (SE), safety and mis-
sion assurance (S&MA), and integration and test (IAT). While SEER outputs the cost of
each component individually, the CADRes recording the money spent on each mission do
not necessarily go into as much detail, and sometimes differ in the level of detail from
mission to mission. CADRes typically record the systems level costs of NASA, the system
level costs of the spacecraft bus, the cost of each spacecraft subsystem, and the total cost of
each payload instrument.
In addition to presenting the error in the estimate of the total cost of each mission,
the errors were broken down into the standard NASA WBS items, and the spacecraft
bus estimate was further broken down by subsystem. Per the SEER space guidance, the
NASA level PM, SE, and S&MA (WBS 1, 2, & 3) estimates were rolled up together
while the payload total (WBS 5), spacecraft bus total (WBS 6), and IAT (WBS 10) were
presented separately. In addition, the spacecraft bus total is broken down into the PM, SE,
and IAT costs of the contractor building the spacecraft bus as well as the spacecraft bus
subsystems: structures, thermal, propulsion Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C),
communications, electrical power, harness (sometimes rolled up with electrical power),
and Command and Data Handling (C&DH). The mission total was defined as all of the
costs that were estimated in the present study for a particular mission, namely WBS 1,
2, & 3, payload total, spacecraft bus total, and WBS 10. The mission total cost did
not include Science/Technology, Mission Operations, Launch Vehicle, Ground Systems,
Education and Public Outreach, software development, or any other aspects of the mission
that were not included in the estimate. There were several instruments without enough
supporting technical documentation to estimate their cost. Such instruments were omitted
from the estimates presented in the present study. Similarly, there were certain spacecraft
components such as the RTG on New Horizons that SEER could not estimate and were not
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included in the estimates. SEER’s errors in estimating each of these systems and subsystems
are presented, except in cases where the CADRe data did not provide a detailed enough
breakdown.
In addition, the average error, weighted average error, median error, and standard
deviation of the errors are presented for eachWBS and subsystem. The average and median
errors are simply the mean and median value of the errors for a given system or subsystem.
The weighted average error is the mean value of the errors weighted by the actual costs,
which were converted from real-year dollars to a common base year for comparison.
5.3.1. SEER Point Estimates. SEER is capable of producing both probabilistic
cost estimates and point cost estimates. The point estimate is the median value of the
probabilistic estimate, meaning there is a 50% chance the estimate will be greater than the
actual costs and a 50% chance the estimate will be below the actual costs. This section
will examine errors in SEER’s point estimates. SEER’s errors in estimating mission total,
system level, payload total, and spacecraft bus total costs are given in 5.3. The missions
are ordered by the magnitude of the actual cost for each mission included in this study;
where IBEX was the least expensive mission and Juno was the most expensive. Note, that
this ordering only takes into account the costs estimated by this study. For example, New
Horizons cost more thanMESSENGER, but it is ordered betweenWISE andMESSENGER
because New Horizons payload, RTG, and operations costs were not included.
The first column of Figure 5.3 shows SEER’s error in estimating total mission
cost for each of the twelve missions. Of the twelve missions in the present study, SEER
overestimated the cost of six and underestimated the cost of six, resulting in a median error
of -0.3%. Therefore, in this aspect SEER was shown to be very accurate because it was
just as likely to overpredict the cost as underpredict it. The average error was 23%, but the
weighted averagewas only 5%. Thus, SEERwasmore likely to overestimate the costs of low
cost missions, and underestimate the cost of high cost missions. Additionally, when SEER
underestimated the cost of a mission it was typically a small error, whereas overestimates
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Figure 5.3. Percentage error of SEER estimates for mission total, system level, payload
total, and spacecraft total costs
tended to be larger errors. For example, the second smallest mission, CONTOUR, was
overestimated by 99%, whereas the second largest mission, SMAP, was underestimated by
-42%.
Galorath documented that SEER estimates have an average error of -1%, with a
standard deviation of 19%. However, it is not known whether the -1% average error from
the Galorath study is a weighted average or not. Regardless, when compared to the 5%
and 23% weighted average seen in the present study, SEER was not as accurate as in the
Galorath study. Additionally, the present study found that the standard deviation of the error
in SEER’s estimates was 43%, over twice as much as the Galorath study’s value of 19%,
meaning SEER’s estimates were not as precise as in the Galorath study either. However, the
Galorath study and the present study were not conducted in the same fashion, with the same
goals, and used different data sets. The Galorath study used the data from the end of the
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mission whereas the present study used predicted masses at CDR. Additional factors that
may have contributed to the large errors in the current study vs the results of the Galorath
study are discussed in 5.4.
The second column of 5.3 shows SEER’s error in estimating WBS 1, 2, & 3 costs
which represent NASAs Project Management (PM), Systems Engineering (SE), and Safety
and Mission Assurance (S&MA). The last column shows the error in estimating WBS
10, the final Integration Assembly and Test (IAT) of the spacecraft with its payload and
launch vehicle for each mission. All system level costs were estimated using the specific
settings recommended by Galorath in their SEER Space Guidance document[65]. However,
the weighted average error of WBS 1, 2, & 3 was 22%, and the weighted average error
of WBS 10 was 33%. In contrast, the weighted averages for the Payload and Spacecraft
Bus were -1% and -3%, respectively. The standard deviation of the WBS 1, 2, & 3 and
WBS 10 estimates were 99% and 70%, respectively. In contrast, the standard deviation
of the Payload and Spacecraft Bus estimates were 54% and 39%, respectively. Thus, the
systems cost estimates at the mission level contributed more error and uncertainty than the
payload and spacecraft cost estimates. The fifth column shows the systems level cost for the
spacecraft bus. In general, the spacecraft bus’s systems costs were underestimated.
Figure 5.4 shows SEER’s errors in estimating each subsystem of the spacecraft bus
for each mission. The weighted average error of all the subsystems was 8%. This is in
contrast to the spacecraft bus total in 5.3 of -3%. Thus, SEER underestimated PM, SE,
and IAT costs associated with a contractor building a spacecraft bus, but overestimated
the costs of designing and producing the subsystem components. SEER overestimated
the cost of the structures and mechanisms for all missions except SMAP and Juno, the
two largest missions. SEER underestimated the cost of half of the thermal subsystems,
but when it overestimated the costs, the magnitude of the error was larger, giving the
thermal subsystems an overall weighted average error of 17%. The propulsion subsystems
were typically overestimated, but when they were underestimated the error was less than
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Figure 5.4. SEER Subsystems Comparison
-50%. This brought the weighted average of the propulsion subsystem error down to -19%.
GN&C errors were relatively small with the exception of CONTOUR. However, the GN&C
subsystem of CONTOUR was only 4% of the subsystems’ cost, so while the percent error
was very large the absolute error was only moderate. SEER underestimated the majority
of the communication subsystems costs. The communication subsystem is the subsystem
most underestimated by SEER with a weighted average error of -31%. Electrical power
was consistently overestimated except in the case of Dawn, the only mission in this study
which utilized solar electric propulsion. The electrical power subsystem was the second
most overestimated subsystem by SEER, with a weighted average error of 35%. The
harness subsystem cost was the subsystemmost accurately estimated by SEER. The harness
subsystem’s weighted average error, median error and standard deviation are all smaller in
magnitude than all other subsystems. The C&DH subsystem, in contrast, had the largest
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error and standard deviation of all the subsystems. The large error of the C&DH subsystem
is likely due to the large uncertainties in estimating custom integrated circuits, such as Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs).
5.3.2. SEERProbabilistic Estimates. This section examines SEER’s probabilistic
cost estimates. For every input in SEER the user inputs a "least," "likely," and "most" value
corresponding to an optimistic, most likely, and pessimistic assumption about the input.
SEER models uncertainty by assigning each "work element" a distribution of possible costs
in addition to a mean cost. The least/likely/most inputs for each work element correspond
to the lower bound, mode, and upper bound of the Probability Density Function (PDF) of a




B(α,β) 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(5.2)
where B(α, β) is the beta function which itself is a function of gamma functions given by
B(α, β) = Γ(α)Γ(β)
Γ(α + β) (5.3)
α and β are shape parameters given by
α =
(µ − ileast)(2ilikley − ileast − imost)




(µ − ileast) . (5.5)
Where ileast, ilikely, and imost are the least/likely/most inputs into SEER, and µ is the mean
of the distribution given by
µ =




When SEER runs a Monte Carlo simulation, it selects the value of the inputs to its
CERs in a random way determined by Eq. 5.2. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation
are then used to create a cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the cost of the mission.
The frequency that the actual cost of a mission was within SEER’s 80% confidence
interval was used to evaluate the accuracy of SEER’s uncertainty quantification capabilities.
A confidence interval is the interval between two points, or confidence levels, on a CDF.
When a model claims an estimate has an 80% confidence interval, that means 80% of the
time the actual value should be within that interval. Thus, based on SEER’s uncertainty
quantification output, it is expected that actual costs of nine or ten of the twelve missions
(approximately 80%) will be within SEER’s 80% confidence interval. Because SEER
only outputs the values of the CDF, known as confidence levels, at intervals of 10%, the
user must be content with only knowing the 80% confidence interval instead of the more
common 90% or 95% confidence intervals. The 80% confidence intervals generated by
SEER for the mission total cost, payload total cost, and spacecraft bus total cost can be seen
in Figures 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7. Figure 5.5 shows that the only missions with actual costs
outside SEER’s 80% confidence interval were CONTOUR, WISE, and MESSENGER.
Since twelve missions were included, it would be expected that two or three would fall
outside of the confidence interval which is exactly what was observed. It can be concluded
that while the point estimates given by SEER had a wide variance, the CI’s generated by
SEER for the total mission cost captured the actual cost the expected number of times.
It should be noted that the confidence intervals seen in Figure 5.5 are extremely
large. This was primarily due to the uncertainty in modeling the spacecraft from the data
available. In particular, it was extremely difficult to judge the level of heritage of a majority
of the spacecraft components. In some cases, there was no information on whether a
component was a brand new design, or a copy of a previously flown component. In these
cases, the estimators would adjust the new design least, likely, and most inputs to reflect the
uncertainty.
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Figure 5.5. SEER 80% confidence intervals for total mission costs.
Figure 5.6. SEER 80% confidence intervals for total payload costs. The payloads of Dawn
and New Horizons were not modeled.
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Figure 5.7. SEER 80% confidence intervals for total spacecraft bus costs.
The 80% confidence intervals generated by SEER for the payload total cost can be
seen in Figure 5.6. As previously stated, because there was not enough information available
to produce a cost estimate of New Horizons and Dawn’s payload costs, those estimates are
omitted from Figure 5.6. With the ten remaining payloads, it would be expected that eight
of the ten would fall within the confidence interval, however, only four of the payloads do.
The 80% confidence intervals generated by SEER for the spacecraft bus total cost
can be seen in Figure 5.7. Since all twelve spacecraft are included, it is expected that 2-3
will fall outside of the 80% confidence interval. However, five spacecraft fall outside of the
confidence interval. These results will be discussed in the following section.
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5.4. DISCUSSION
In this section, a number of factors that may have adversely affected the outputs of
SEER in this blind study are discussed. Results presented in this section were produced
after the results in the previous section ( 5.3) were analyzed and therefore are not blind.
Some of what is discussed in this section is the interpretation of the results by the authors
based on their experience as cost estimators and has not been rigorously tested.
5.4.1. Mass Estimation and Related Uncertainty. In SEER, mass is the primary
scalingmechanism for themajority of components in the structures, thermal, and propulsion
subsystems, as well as a few components in other subsystems. For the present study, it was
assumed that the low mass input was the current best estimate, the likely estimate was the
current best estimate plus the mass contingency, and the high estimate was 30% above the
likely estimate. These assumed mass inputs are common in the cost estimating community
and are recommended by the SEER Space Guidance document[65]. Despite being a
common assumption in the cost estimating community, it is not clear where the assumption
that the high mass estimate should be equal to the likely assumption plus 30% originates.
However, this assumption is consistent with the discussion in paper by Wilhite et al. which
showed that the average spacecraft increases in mass by 28.5% from its preliminary design
to launch[121]. The 30% assumption does not take into account the design maturity of the
components, or how close the mission is to completion. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory
mass margins approach defined in their handbook of design principles for flight systems
bases the mass margin on what phase the mission is in. The handbook recommends mass
margins of 30% at PMSR (Preliminary Mission & Systems Review), and 10% at CDR[67].
The high 30% mass margin used for the present study is likely a contributing factor, for the
high average error seen in the SEER point estimates. However, the high 30% mass margin
also assures that the confidence intervals are large enough to capture the actual mission
costs.
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To test if SEER would perform better with the JPL recommended mass margins
a Python script was written to generate SEER command files to alter the mass inputs
of the structural/mechanical components for each spacecraft/payload. Figure. 5.8 shows
the median estimates and confidence intervals with a mass margin of 10% instead of
30%. While the point estimates improved marginally from previous results the confidence
Figure 5.8. SEER 80% confidence intervals for total mission costs with 10% mass margin.
intervals narrow and upper bound of SMAP’s confidence interval slips below the actual
cost of the mission. Since lowering the upper mass margin does not significantly affect the
lower bound of the estimates the lower bounds of CONTOUR,WISE andMESSENGER do
not slip below their actual costs either. This results in there now being only eight missions
(67%) whose actual costs fell in the 80% confidence interval of the SEER estimates.
Returning to Figure 5.5, three of the twelve missions were overestimated by SEER
to the point that lower bounds of the confidence interval exceeded the actual costs of the
mission. Thus, it is likely that the lower bound of the mass estimate is not low enough,
rather than the upper bound of the mass estimate being too high. Recall that it is common
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practice and explicitly recommended by Galorath to use the Current Best Estimate (CBE)
of the mass to define the lower bound of a beta distribution, the CBE plus contingency mass
to define the mode, and a mass margin added to the mode to define the upper bound. By
defining the CBE as the lower bound this assumes there is a 0% chance that the spacecraft
mass will decrease. However, Figure 5.9a shows this is not true.
Figure 5.9a compares the beta distributions defined by these mass estimates with a
histogram of the launch masses for 31 separate NASA missions. The x-axis is scaled so
that the CBE of the mass of each mission at CDR is equal to zero and the CBE plus mass
contingency multiplied by the mass margin is equal to one, while the y-axis represents the
number of missions. The 31 beta distributions representing the predicted mass of the 31
NASA spacecraft are shown as black lines and the average of the 31 distributions is shown as
a red dashed line. The average distribution has beenmultiplied by a factor of three to make it
clearly visible on the figure. While the majority of mission’s launch masses were within the
predicted range, four of the launch masses were lower than the CDR current best estimate.
SAGE III was the mission whose launch mass was furthest below CBE, launching at 96%
of CBE. Given that the conventional mass modeling assumptions assign a 0% probability
to the launch mass being less than the CBE at CDR, the mass modeling assumptions are
invalid and should be modified. Figure. 5.9b shows a new set of beta distributions using
mass modeling assumptions that have been modified from Figure 5.9a such that the lower
bound of the distribution is 95% of the CBE rather than CBE. Figures 5.9c and 5.9d compare
the empirical CDF defined by the launch masses with the averaged CDF defined by the mass
modeling assumptions. Figure 5.9c compares the empirical CDF of the launch masses with
the averagedCDFdefined by the conventionalmassmodeling assumptionswhile Figure 5.9d
compare the empirical CDF with the averaged CDF defined by the modified mass modeling
assumptions. The y-axis is scaled to the number of missions as opposed to being scaled
from zero to one, as is common practice with CDFs. Both Figures 5.9c and 5.9d display
the Kolmogorav-Smirnov test statistic, which is a method of determining the goodness
82
(a) Conventional mass modeling assumptions at
CDR.
(b) Modified mass modeling assumptions at
CDR.
(c) Conventional mass modeling assumptions at
CDR.
(d) Modified mass modeling assumptions at
CDR.
Figure 5.9. Comparison of beta PDFs and CDFs used to predict mission mass at CDR with
actual mission mass.
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of fit of an empirical CDF to a hypothesized CDF and is simply the maximum difference
between the CDFs[122]. From visual inspection of Figures 5.9c and 5.9d the CDF using the
modifiedmassmodeling assumptions fits the data better than theCDFusing the conventional
mass modeling assumptions. Furthermore, the Kolmogorav-Smirnov test statistic for the
conventional assumptions is 10.6 whereas it is only 7.5 for the modified assumptions.
The Minkowski L1 metric or area metric is more robust than the Kolmogorav-




|F(x) − En(x)|dx (5.7)
where F(x) is the predicted distribution and En(x) is the empirical distribution[123]. The
area metric is commonly used to validate statistical methods and measures the area between
the empirical and hypothesized CDF. The area metric for the conventional CDF was 4.4 and
was 2.3 for themodifiedCDF.Again themodifiedmassmodeling assumptions outperformed
the conventional ones.
Figure 5.10 shows the same types of plots and tests as Figure 5.9 but instead
compares predictions at PDR with launch masses for 29 NASA missions. The conventional
mass modeling assumptions at PDR are the same as at CDR only with a 30% mass margin
defining the upper bound instead of 10%. Figure 5.10a shows that these bounds do not
encompass all the missions. SAGE III had a launch mass 6% less than the CBE at PDR.
Thus, the lower bound is adjusted to be 94% CBE as seen in Figure 5.10b. Figure 5.10c
show the empirical CDF defined by the actual launch masses compared to the averaged CDF
defined by the conventional mass estimating assumptions which has a Kolmogorav-Smirnov
test statistic of 6.2 and an area metric of 2.3. Figure 5.10d shows the same emprical CDF
but compared to the averaged CDF defined by the modified mass estimating assumptions
which now has a Kolmogorav-Smirnov test statistic of 3.8 and an area metric of 1.3.
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(a) Conventional mass modeling assumptions at
PDR.
(b) Modified mass modeling assumptions at
PDR.
(c) Conventional mass modeling assumptions at
PDR.
(d) Modified mass modeling assumptions at
PDR.
Figure 5.10. Comparison of beta PDFs and CDFs used to predict mission mass at PDR
with actual mission mass.
While it is uncommon for missions to launch with a lower mass than the CBE at PDR
or CDR it is does happen and thus it is invalid for cost estimators exclude the possibility.
The authors recommend that the conventional mass modeling assumptions be modified
such that at PDR the lower bound is 94% of CBE and at CDR the lower bound is 95%
of CBE. The SEER estimates for the twelve missions in the blind study were recomputed
such that the mass estimates for all mechanical/structural components had a lower bound of
95% of the CBE instead of the CBE. This lowered the point estimates and lower bounds of
the estimates slightly but no additional missions fell within the confidence intervals of the
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estimates. While mass is primary input used to scale the cost of mechanical components it
does not always have as big of an effect on cost as other inputs such as percent new design.
However, depending on the details provided in the documentation determining these other
inputs can be challenging without the help of subject matter experts as discussed in the
following subsection.
5.4.2. Subject Matter Experts. The role of subject matter experts is critical in
any estimation. Unfortunately, since the missions in the present study took place over the
past 20 years it was not possible to contact any of the subject matter experts who worked
on these missions to clarify details missing in the CADRes or supporting documents. As
a result, there was a wide range of uncertainty in the inputs and results. One of the
subsystems driving this overestimation was the C&DH subsystem. Each of these spacecraft
shared a common C&DH electronics module with significant heritage. The documents
from CDR described the electronics thoroughly, including circuit diagrams, and technical
specifications. However, they did not mention that the majority of the circuit boards
were copied from previous missions. During the blind estimation, it was assumed that
these electronics boards were modified to fit the requirements of their respective missions,
however, it is more likely that the electronics were copies of previous flight units with only
one board being unique to each mission. A five minute conversation with an electrical
engineer from any of these missions could have cleared up the confusion and significantly
improved the accuracy of the modeling.
5.4.3. Prototyping Assumptions. The number of assumed prototypes can have a
significant effect on the cost estimate. In SEER, each additional prototype adds to the
development cost. A standard assumption in the cost estimating community is a prototype
input value of 1.3. A fractional prototype represents a prototype which does not have the
full functionality of the working component, such as a breadboard, engineering design unit,
or boiler plate unit. For many spacecraft components there were no details provided on
how many prototypes were made during mission development. When there was no data on
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the number of prototypes, the assumed value was 1.3. It is unclear where the assumption
that the average spacecraft component for a NASA science mission will have 1.3 prototypes
originated. The authors plan to investigate the effect of the number of prototypes on the
accuracy of cost estimates in the future. The standard assumption of 1.3 prototypes may
have inflated the SEER estimates as it is possible that in some cases the reason there was
no prototype information was documented for certain components was because there were
no prototypes for those components.
5.4.4. Experience of Estimators. The experience and skill of the estimator also
plays a significant role in the accuracy of a cost estimate. Estimators B and C were trained
to use SEER and completed a number of training exercises for several weeks before the
study. In addition, estimators B and C were advised by more experienced estimators who
were on hand to answer any questions they might have. However, we would be remiss not to
mention that a cost estimator with several years of experience would likely have produced
more accurate and precise results with SEER.
5.5. CONCLUSIONS OF VALIDATION STUDY
The present section evaluated the parametric cost estimating tool SEER-H and its
capability to model the cost of NASA space missions through a blind study. The study
was blind in that the estimators had no knowledge of the actual costs of the missions being
estimated. This was done to prevent cognitive biases, such as anchoring, from influencing
the way the SEER was used to estimate the costs.
The present study found that SEER had an average error of 23%, median error
of -0.3%, and a standard deviation of 43%. Weighing the errors by the actual cost of the
mission the average error was only 5%. The present study also determined that SEER tended
to overestimate smaller missions and underestimate larger missions. SEER’s uncertainty
quantification capabilities worked well at the mission level; of the twelve missions in the
present study, nine of the missions’ actual costs were within the 80% confidence interval
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given by SEER. However, at the payload and spacecraft levels only 40% and 58% of the
actual costs fell within the 80% confidence interval of SEER. One major observation was
that in general the larger themission and themore items estimated themore accurate SEER’s
estimates would be.
There are several factors that may have affected the results of this study. These
factors include the assumptions about mass margins, numbers of prototypes, as well as
the level of detail provided in the documentation of the missions and the experience of
the estimators. The effects of mass margin assumptions were explored in detail. It was
determined from comparing actual masses of 31 spacecraft with the predictedmass earlier in
the design process that the current mass margin assumptions should be modified to include
the possibility that the spacecraft may decrease in mass before launch as this happens in
some cases. The authors recommend that in the future, the lower bound of the mass estimate
be 94% of CBE at PDR and 95% of CBE at CDR as rather than the typical assumption of
the lower bound being the CBE.
Another factor that likely had a large effect on the results of the present studywas that
the estimators were not able to ask clarifying questions from subject matter experts involved
in the missions. The estimators had to rely on documents presented at major reviews only,
which often omitted important information; such as, the heritage of a particular component.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This section summarizes the major results of this dissertation and provides guidance
for future work to be completed in the area of estimating the cost of future spaceflight
programs.
6.1. CONCLUSIONS
There were three major accomplishments of this dissertation. First, cost estimates
of three human Mars EDL concepts were presented and compared. Second, an extension to
the systems analysis tool SAPE, known as SAPE-C, was created and demonstrated. SAPE-C
allows the user to quickly determine the effect that an improved technology or change in
vehicle configuration will have on the cost of an entire vehicle or campaign. Finally, a blind
validation study of the cost estimating tool SEER-H was presented along with an analysis
of the current standard cost modeling assumptions.
Of the three EDL vehicles whose costs were estimated, the Cobra–MRV had the
highest mass but lowest production cost, HIAD had the lowest mass and second lowest
production cost, while ADEPT had the second lowest mass and highest production cost.
The development costs for HIAD and Cobra–MRVwere nearly identical while ADEPT was
about 26% higher. However, the ADEPT concept is at an early point in its design phase
and had very high margins put on all its components, which may have unfairly impacted its
cost estimate. A detailed analysis of launch costs and the costs of varying sized in space
propulsion stages will be needed to determine whether the Cobra–MRV or HIAD concepts
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will be the most cost effective over the course of a campaign. However, as private companies
such as SpaceX continue to offer cheaper and cheaper access to space it is likely that the
low cost/high mass Cobra–MRV will be the concept with the lowest overall cost.1
SAPE-C, the new extension to the systems analysis tool SAPE, advances the state
of the art in cost estimation and systems analysis of human Mars EDL systems. By linking
the output of several systems analysis tools with the commercial cost estimating software
SEER-H, SAPE-C is able to model costs in a dynamic way not possible with traditional
costing tools. The effects of payload, ballistic coefficients, main engine specific impulse,
and main engine thrust-to-weight ratio on the total hardware cost of a HIAD entry vehicle
were presented. It was determined that lander hardware costs over a campaign are not
always minimized by minimizing the TMI mass. In addition, the payload per lander is the
factor which has the largest impact on lander hardware costs over a campaign. Designing
a lander to carry more payload decreases its gear ratio making it more mass efficient, in
addition the first unit production cost per ton of payload also decreases. However, this
also increases the development cost and reduces the cost efficiency of building multiple
identical units. The payload per lander that minimizes lander hardware costs is dependent
upon the total payload being delivered to Mars, and trends to higher payloads per lander as
the total campaign payload increases. In contrast, if the goal is to minimize TMI mass over
a campaign, the payload per lander should be made as large as possible.
The cost of a lander with a given payload can be minimized by designing the ballistic
coefficient of the aerocapture HIAD to be as large as possible without requiring a backshell,
or otherwise putting the vehicle at risk. In contrast, a large EDL HIAD with a smaller
ballistic coefficient can reduce propulsion requirements and costs. Costs are minimized
1Each of the EDL concepts (HIAD, ADEPT, and Cobra–MRV) require a 10 m payload fairing. While
the Falcon Heavy rocket built by SpaceX technically has the payload capacity required to lift each of these
concepts to LEO non of these vehicle concepts would fit inside its payload fairing.
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when the EDL HIAD’s ballistic coefficient is around 130 kg/m2. Decreasing the ballistic
coefficient of the EDLHIAD below 130 kg/m2 will increase the cost of the lander hardware,
but also decrease the TMI mass.
Specific impulse also has a significant effect on cost. For every 1% that specific
impulse is raised, it reduces lander costs by 0.17% and TMI mass by 0.22%. Improving
CH4-LOX engines to increase specific impulse will reduce costs as long as the cost of
improving the engines and extra mass from extending nozzles does not outweigh the cost
and mass savings. Increasing engine thrust to allow a higher thrust-to-weight ratio can
also reduce cost. However, this study was not able to determine the thrust-to-weight ratio
that minimized cost as SAPE-C is currently not modeling how a number of key propulsion
components are changing with thrust.
The uncertainty quantification capabilities of SAPE-C were also demonstrated.
SAPE-C is capable of generating a Confidence Interval (CI) for each estimate in the
tradespace. It was determined that while the size of the CIs increase as the payload of
the lander increases, the CI relative to an estimate’s median cost stays fairly constant.
This dissertation also evaluated the parametric cost estimating tool SEER-H and its
capability to model the cost of NASA space missions through a blind study. The study
was blind in that the estimators had no knowledge of the actual costs of the missions being
estimated. This was done to prevent cognitive biases, such as anchoring, from influencing
the way the SEER was used to estimate the costs.
The blind study found that SEER had an average error of 23%, median error of
-0.3%, and a standard deviation of 43%. Weighing the errors by the actual cost of the
mission, the average error was only 5%. The blind study also determined that SEER tended
to overestimate smaller missions and underestimate larger missions. SEER’s uncertainty
quantification capabilities worked well at the mission level; of the twelve missions studied,
nine of the missions’ actual costs were within the 80% confidence interval given by SEER.
However, at the payload and spacecraft levels only 40% and 58% of the actual costs fell
91
within the 80% confidence interval of SEER. One major observation was that in general,
the larger the mission and the more items estimated by SEER, the more accurate SEER’s
estimates would be.
There are several factors which may have affected the results of the blind study.
These factors include the assumptions about mass margins, numbers of prototypes, as well
as the level of detail provided in the documentation of the missions and the experience
of the estimators. The effects of mass margin assumptions were explored in detail. It
was determined from comparing actual masses of 31 spacecraft with the predicted mass
earlier in the design process that the current mass margin assumptions should be modified
to include the possibility that the spacecraft may decrease in mass before launch, as this
happens in some cases. The author recommend that in the future, the lower bound of the
mass estimate be 94% of CBE at PDR and 95% of CBE at CDR as rather than the typical
assumption of the lower bound being the CBE.
Another factor which likely had a large effect on the results of the present study was
that the estimators were not able to ask clarifying questions from subject matter experts
involved in the missions. The estimators had to rely only on documents presented at major
reviews. These documents often omitted important information such as the heritage of
a particular component. Ultimately, the large uncertainty in the level of effort required
for each mission lead to the large uncertainty bounds seen in the cost estimates for each
mission. While the error bounds for each mission were large, the expected number of
missions’ actual costs fell within the bounds. This finding should increase the confidence
that mission managers and project teams have in probabilistic cost estimates.
6.2. FUTUREWORK
While advancements to the sate-of-the-art inmodeling the cost ofMars EDLvehicles
have been made in this dissertation, there are several areas that warrant future work. The
most important item for future work is to obtain or produce a parametric model (likely from
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EXAMINE) of an in-space propulsion stage that can be sized to send varying TMI masses
of the different lander concepts on TMI trajectories. That model will then be added to the
SAPE-C framework and will allow SAPE-C to predict the effect that TMI mass has on the
cost of a humans to mars mission. Ideally, several propulsion concepts would be compared
such as Solar Electric Propulsion, Nuclear Thermal Rockets, storable chemical propellants,
and cryogenic chemical propellants. In addition to this, several mission architectures
should be compared such as launching directly to Mars vs rendezvous in low earth orbit vs
rendezvous in distant retrograde orbit with orbital refueling[124].
Parametric models of Cobra–MRV and the ADEPT lander should be introduced to
the SAPE-C framework so that trade studies of the effect of those concept’s payload capacity,
ballistic coefficient, MPS specific impulse, and thrust-to-weight ratio on the spacecraft’s cost
can also be studied. Additional tradespaces should be considered for all vehicle concepts
such as aerocapturing into different sized orbits, landing at different elevations and latitudes,
and altering TPS thickness margins.
Finally, it would be beneficial to add more cases to the validation study. If this was
done, it could significantly increase the confidence that NASA managers and project teams
have in the methodologies to predict the cost of future space missions.
APPENDIX A.
BLIND VALIDATION STUDY OF PARAMETRIC COST ESTIMATION TOOL
PRICE TRUEPLANNING FOR NASA SCIENCE MISSIONS
94
This Appendix contains the sections in the conference paper "Blind StudyValidating
Parametric Costing Tools PRICE TruePlanning and SEER-H for NASA Science Missions"
which evaluated the cost estimating tool PRICE TruePlanning. This work was presented
at the 2018 AIAA SPACE Forum, but since PRICE TruePlanning was not used in any of
the cost models presented in the main body of the dissertation this work was omitted from
Section 5.
1. PRICE TRUEPLANNING
PRICE Systems has also performed an internal validation study of their tool PRICE
TruePlanning[64]. Their study included thirteen NASA robotic spacecraft, ten of which
were also in the SEER study. Of the thirteen missions included in the study, four are
Discovery, five are Explorer, three are New Frontiers, and one is a heliophysics satellite
that does not fall into the other classes. PRICE Systems validation study found that PRICE
TruePlanning’s average error was +1% with a standard deviation of 13%, meaning roughly
68% of all TruePlanning estimates will be from -12% to +14% of the actual costs and 95%
of all estimates will be from -25% to +27% of the actual costs, assuming the mean values
follow a Gaussian distribution. As with Galorath’s study, it is not clear if the estimators at
PRICE Systems knew the mission costs before using the tool to estimate the mission costs.
2. RESULTS
2.1. PRICE TRUEPLANNING POINT ESTIMATES
The results for PRICE’s performance in estimating mission total costs and systems
costs can be seen in Figure 1. As with the SEER results, the missions are ordered from
least to most expensive. Of the twelve missions in the study, PRICE overestimated the cost
of ten and underestimated the cost of two, and the median error was 50.0%. Additionally,
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the average error was 52%, and the weighted average error was only slightly better at 43%.
Therefore, PRICE was much more likely to overestimate mission cost. Interestingly, the
two missions that PRICE underestimated were the two missions that SEER underestimated
by the largest margin. In fact, if you order the results by percent error the resulting rank
order is very similar between the two tools, with the one significant exception being Kepler.
PRICE Systems claims that PRICE estimates have an average error of +1% with a
standard deviation of 13%. With the major caveat that this study employed technical data
from CDR, while PRICE used as built data, both average and standard deviation were found
to be significantly higher than these values. This study found the average and weighted
average error to be 52% and 43% respectively, and the standard deviation to be 47%. PRICE
also overestimated IAT for every mission. The smallest error was an overestimation of 67%
and the highest was overestimated by 403%. PRICE overestimated the WBS 1, 2, & 3 costs
of all missions except for IBEX, with a weighted average error of 106%.
Figure 1. PRICE Systems Comparison
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The most accurate and precise estimates from PRICE came from estimating the
payload subsystems cost. PRICE’s weighted average error was only 9% and the standard
deviation of the estimates was only 37%. SEER’s estimate of payload total cost was more
accurate with a weighted average error of -1% but was less precise with a standard deviation
of 54%.
Figure 2 shows PRICE’s errors for the estimation of each subsystem of the spacecraft
bus for each mission in this study. The average and weighted average errors for all the
spacecraft subsystems are 60% and 31% respectively. These errors were driven by the
fact that PRICE overestimated the cost of every subsystem except propulsion, where the
weighted average error was -51%. The only two missions PRICE underestimated the total
spacecraft bus were SMAP and GRAIL. Interestingly SMAP was the only mission PRICE
underestimated the structures cost, and GRAIL did not have subsystem costs broken down.
PRICE was most accurate in estimating the GN&C subsystem where the weighted average
Figure 2. PRICE Subsystems Comparison
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error was only 5%, however, the average error and standard deviation were driven higher by
the significant error for CONTOUR. On the other end of the spectrum, the three subsystems
with the largest error were C&DH, Electrical Power, and Communications, with weighted
average errors of 111%, 82%, and 57% respectively. The potential explanation for this
degree of error is further examined in the discussion section.
2.2. PRICE TRUEPLANNING PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATES
Similar to SEER, PRICE too has the ability to perform uncertainty analysis. For
every input in PRICE the user has the option to input an optimistic, most likely, and
pessimistic value. Unlike SEER, in PRICE the user selects what inputs to apply uncertainty
to, and what the inputs should be. Whereas SEER has default least/likely/most assumptions
for nearly every input which can be adjusted by the user as needed. Within PRICE, the user
must select what inputs to apply uncertainty to. In this study, the cost estimators applied
uncertainty to weight and new design. PRICE then quantifies uncertainty in a similar way to
SEER, except it uses a triangular distribution instead of a beta distribution. Details of their
methods can be found in "FRISK-Formal Risk Assessment of System Cost Estimates"[54].
PRICE outputs the values of the CDF from the 5% to 95% confidence levels. It is therefore
possible to generate a 90% confidence interval, however, for consistency with SEER, the
80% confidence interval is presented instead. The 80% confidence intervals generated from
PRICE for the twelve missions in this study can be seen in Figure 3. It is immediately
clear that none of the PRICE estimates fall within their confidence intervals. With an 80%
confidence interval, it would be expected that nine or ten of the twelve missions would fall
within the bounds of the estimate.
Another significant difference between PRICE and SEER is the confidence level
at which the point estimate falls. In SEER, the point estimate is the median value of the
distribution, meaning the uncertainty inputs drive the point estimate. However, in PRICE
the point estimate is generated using only the most likely input. Since the input distributions
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Figure 3. PRICE Uncertainty Analysis
are typically right skewed the end result is that the confidence level of the point estimate
is substantially lower in PRICE compared to SEER. The distributions produced by PRICE
are so right skewed that the majority of the point estimates fall below the 10% confidence
level and outside of the 80% confidence interval.
3. DISCUSSION
The estimates developed using the Space Missions Catalog within PRICE True-
Planning in this study were relatively inaccurate. The most likely explanation for this is
related to the dependence of the tool’s CERs on mass, particularly for electronic compo-
nents. The three subsystems where PRICE most severely overestimated costs were those
with the highest number of electronic components: C&DH, Power, and Communications.
The overestimation of these subsystems then effects the estimates of the systems level cost.
PRICE’s estimate of PM, SE, and S&MA (project and payload/spacecraft level) and IAT
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costs are strongly correlated with the subsystem level hardware costs. Further, many of the
missions had large electronic boxes without sufficient information to break down the mass
into individual boards. In SEER, where electronics cost depend on other factors such as
clock speed, number of integrated circuits per circuit board, and number of pins per circuit
board, the information was available on specification sheets. However, this information
did not include mass and the estimators had to make educated guesses on not only the
breakdown of mass between the individual circuit boards, but also the breakdown between
structures and electronics mass (a significant cost driver). The reliance on mass is fur-
ther exacerbated in the uncertainty analysis, where, as discussed above, the assumed input
distribution is heavily right-skewed, potentially more than necessary for this point in the
project’s lifecycle. Another, and likely related, potential source of error was leveraging the
SEER Space Guidance document for input assumptions when data in CADRe was lacking.
This may not be appropriate in certain areas, particularly in the heritage assumptions of
the spacecraft bus. A similar guidance document for PRICE would be a useful addition to
the PRICE documentation. Lastly, there is simply more work required to determine, with
certainty, the sources of error in the PRICE estimates, particularly considering the Space
Missions Catalog’s leveraging of CADRe data (or related data) to develop the CERs.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The present study determined that Price had an average error of 52%, median error
of 50%, and standard deviation of 45%. Weighing the errors by the actual cost for each
the mission, the weighted average error is 43%. PRICE’s uncertainty quantification tool
performed poorly, which may be due to the fact that uncertainty could be applied to far
fewer input parameters than in SEER. None of the twelve missions fell within PRICE’s 80%
confidence interval.
APPENDIX B.
























Figure 4. Payload vs. Thrust-to-Weight Ratio Trades.
APPENDIX C.
SEER-H MONTE CARLO CONVERGANCE STUDY
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Because of the large amount of time it takes for SEER-H to run a Monte Carlo
analysis a convergence study was run to determine an appropriate number of Monte Carlo
samples to use. SEER does Monte Carlo simulations in two modes, fully correlated and
fully uncorrelated. In the fully correlated mode, each random sample is used to set the
probability level of the inputs for all work elements of the model. In the fully uncorrelated
mode, a different random sample is used to set the probability level of the inputs to eachwork
element individually. Figure 1 shows the results of the convergence study. The study utilized
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1. SEER-H Monte Carlo convergence study.
a SEER model of a spacecraft and varied the number of Monte Carlo iterations. SEER
allows the user to select between 100 and 10,000 iterations for a Monte Carlo simulation,
so the x-axis of the plots runs from 0 to 10,000 and shows the results in steps of 1000
(with an initial step of 900 from 100 to 1000 iterations). The y-axis of the plots shows
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the normalized cost or standard deviation of the CDF of the cost distribution where the
normalization constant is the value achieved at 10,000 iterations. To achieve errors of less
than 1% in both mean cost and standard deviation it is recommended that the user select a
minimum of 2,000 iterations.
APPENDIX D.
POST 2 OUTPUT AND DISCUSSION
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Before the author of this dissertation was aware that SAPE existed he attempted to
make a similar program that would integrate POST II with EXAMINE and some data on
required HIAD TPS thickness. However, this work stopped when the author realized that
SAPE was already doing exactly what he was trying to accomplish only in more detail.
SAPE had also already been peer reviewed, used in a number of NASA studies, and it was
already shown to be accurate. Recreating SAPE would have been time consuming and not
accomplished anything of significant value. Instead the author focused on developing SAPE-
C an extension to SAPE. This Appendix details some of the work that was accomplished
before the author learned of SAPE and started working on SAPE-C.
A Python script was created that would automatically edit POST II input files. A
POST II input file for a baseline HIAD entry vehicle landing 20 t of payload on the surface of
Mars was obtained. The python script would then automatically edit vehicle and simulation
properties such as ballistic coefficient/HIAD diameter, main engine specific impulse, main
engine thrust-to-weight ratio, and the targeted maximum gs experienced during entry. For
each combination of vehicle/entry parameters, the script would write a POST II file, call
POST II, run the file, and save the output. A separate MATLAB script was then used to
assemble the output and plot it.
In its final form the python script was only editing vehicle properties in POST II but
had not yet integrated EXAMINE or a similar tool to size the vehicle fuel tanks, structures,
etc. Thus, the information shown in the plots of this appendix does not necessarily represent
the performance of actual vehicles, but the trends are useful for understanding the design
tradespace of human Mars entry vehicles.
Figure 1 shows the effect that the specific impulse of the main propulsion systems
of a HIAD entry vehicle has on the total fuel burned during entry. It also shows how
changing the HIAD diameter (and therefore the ballistic coefficient) effects required fuel
burn. As expected the higher specific impulse propulsion systems require less propellant
to be burned. This plot does not take into account the effect that a reduced fuel tank size
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Figure 1. The effect of main engine specific impulse on fuel burn for entry vehicles with
HIADs ranging from 12 to 25 m.
would have on the vehicle. As a result, the actual propellant mass savings would be slightly
greater than shown. Figure 1 (along with Figures. 2 and 3) also show how the size of the
HIAD effects the total propellant burned. Initially increasing HIAD decreases the total fuel
burn significantly. However, the larger the diameter becomes the less of an effect it has on
decreasing propellant consumption. These plots do not take into account the mass of the
HIAD which would be increasing as the HIAD diameter continues to increase. Thus, in
reality there would be a point where the propellant burned would start to increase as the
HIAD became larger. This is observed to be the case in the SAPE-C output presented in
Figure 4.4d.
Figure 2 shows the effect that altering the thrust-to-weight ratio has on the total
amount of propellant burned. Clearly increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio of the main
engines significantly reduces the total propellant necessary. For most cases this amounts
to several hundred kilograms of mass saved. This however, does not take into account the
increased mass of the descent engines. In addition, there are operational reasons to avoid
using high thrust engines. For example, in the final phase of flight the lander which is nearly
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Figure 2. The effect of thrust-to-weight ratio on fuel burn for entry vehicles with HIADs
ranging from 12 to 25 m.
empty of fuel has to descend at a constant rate to safely land on the surface of Mars. Since
the Martian gravity is about a third of Earth’s gravity a spacecraft with a thrust to weight
ratio of two would have to throttle its engines to one sixth their maximum thrust in order
to descend at a constant rate. Deep throttling like this is technically challenging and may
significantly increase the cost of engine development.
Figure 3 shows the effect that a targeted maximum deceleration will have on propel-
lant burned. The maximum deceleration is targeted by altering the initial flight path angle
of the entry vehicle. A steeper flight path angle will generally result in a higher maximum
deceleration. Figure 3 shows that the maximum deceleration experienced by the entry
vehicle has a very small effect on the total propellant burned especially with higher HIAD
diameters. Note that discontinuities in Figure 3 are likely due to POST II not converging or
generating an otherwise erroneous result. Since this work was in the preliminary stages and
was soon abandoned, no significant effort was put into figuring out why the discontinuities
occurred.
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Figure 3. The effect of targeted maximum deceleration on fuel burn for entry vehicles with
HIADs ranging from 12 to 25 m.
Figures 4, and 5 show the effect that the maximum deceleration has on the maximum
heat rate and total heat load experienced. Figure 4 shows that the maximum heat rate is
decreased by utilizing a larger HIAD diameter and by using a shallower entry with a lower
Figure 4. The effect of targeted maximum deceleration on maximum heat rate for entry
vehicles with HIADs ranging from 12 to 25 m.
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Figure 5. The effect of targeted maximum deceleration on total heat load for entry vehicles
with HIADs ranging from 12 to 25 m.
max g load. Decreasing the maximum heat rate allows for thinner layers of refractory fabric
to be used on the outer shell of a HIAD. However, Figure 5 shows that the total heat load is
increased when flying trajectories with lower maximum decelerations. A higher total heat
load requires more layers of insulating fabric within a HIAD.
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